

June 2025



# Fair Rents, Stable Communities: How Strong Rent Stabilization Can Help Passaic Thrive

Amee Chew







## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The City of Passaic, NJ, is at the crossroads of a critical choice: policymakers can safeguard low-cost housing stock and protect renters to help our communities thrive, rather than allowing displacement and predatory real estate speculation to take deeper hold.

In February 2025, with the mayor's backing, Passaic enacted a historic rent stabilization ordinance limiting rent increases to 6 percent plus a pass-through fee, in multifamily rentals built before 1978.<sup>1</sup> The additional fee is set based on municipal tax increases for landlords, and allows landlords to pass on the cost of those increases to tenants.

An estimated 9,800 tenant households are now covered by Passaic's new rent stabilization measure.<sup>2</sup> Renter households are mostly low-income, and disproportionately households of color.<sup>3</sup> Passaic's rent stabilization ordinance protects against egregious rent gouging. However, the limit it places on rent increases is high compared to local housing market conditions, and thus, many renters will still face unaffordable increases. Before the new regulations, median rent in Passaic increased an average of 4 percent annually from 2021-23<sup>4</sup> – well below today's cap, but even a 4 percent increase has been a great strain to renter households.

The recent rent stabilization ordinance is an important step in the right direction. But the City of Passaic must do more to ensure its policy has the most advantageous impact against displacement, by limiting annual rent increases to 3 percent and closing loopholes.

*Photos on pages 2, 5, 7, 11, 25 and 26: Tenants march to demand repairs and reasonable rents, September 2024. (Make the Road New Jersey)*

We estimate, if stronger rent stabilization only allowed landlords to increase the rent by a maximum of 3 percent annually, this would put **over \$4 million** more back in the pockets of renters each year – including **\$3.5 million in the pockets of low-income households**.<sup>5</sup> What's more, when renters thrive, so do their communities. Low-income households are more likely to actually spend added income, feeding money back into the local economy to generate business activity, employment, and tax revenue.<sup>6</sup>

If the City of Passaic strengthens its rent stabilization ordinance, this has the potential to help protect over **4,000 households** from homelessness.<sup>7</sup> Many, 38 percent, of Passaic's renter households are extremely low-income; while 4,560 renter households are severely cost-burdened, spending the majority of their income on housing.<sup>8</sup> These precarious households are one unexpected emergency away from becoming unhoused. A lower rent increase cap would more effectively stabilize the most vulnerable families. Preventing homelessness is also far more cost-effective than responding afterwards.

Passaic's rent stabilization ordinance currently allows landlords to increase rents without any limit, to market-rate, when tenants move out. This loophole incentivizes landlords to evict or push out tenants, so they can raise the rent without limit. Instead, the city should adopt vacancy control, which limits rent increases both within and between tenancies. Vacancy control is critical for protecting Passaic's communities from predatory landlords, and for creating longer-term affordability. Otherwise, with tenant turnover, stabilized rents will increasingly come to resemble unfettered, market-rate rents.

Evictions in Passaic County have jumped in recent years from 2,652 filings in 2021 to 6,745 in 2024.<sup>9</sup> Corporate entities, which are known to evict at a higher rate, have been expanding their holdings in Passaic.<sup>10</sup> Most evictions are for non-payment of rent. A lower rent increase limit, along with vacancy control, are both needed to slow the rising displacement and predatory speculation in Passaic.

Only four other New Jersey municipalities with rent stabilization measures allow rent increases of 6 percent or more.<sup>11</sup> Many jurisdictions with rent regulations

set permitted increases far lower, and several limit increases below the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

**Policymakers can more effectively protect Passaic's renters – most of whom are already rent-burdened<sup>12</sup> – by lowering permitted increases to 3 percent or the CPI, whichever is lower.** Policymakers should take swift action to further improve Passaic's rent stabilization ordinance by also: enacting vacancy control, ending loopholes like "below market rate" increases, expanding coverage, and strengthening infrastructure for oversight and enforcement. The city should establish processes for tenants to withhold rent until habitability violations are addressed, provide a publicly accessible rental registry, and fully staff its rent stabilization agency.



## Protecting Community from Displacement

"I truly feel a sense of belonging here in Passaic," says Edwin, who at age 25 is a lifelong resident of the city. "I feel safe here." Edwin shares an apartment with his mother and grandmother. The three of them split the rent and other bills. But as the cost of rent continues to rise, Edwin and his family have begun to explore more affordable apartments outside of Passaic, far from transit and their loved ones.

Passaic's strength is its community. Yet as rents continue to rise, tenants find themselves in increasingly perilous conditions, or forced far away from the communities they call home.



## INTRODUCTION

Across the country and in Passaic, NJ, tenants and unhoused people have been organizing for stronger rent stabilization and tenant protections, as essential policies for effectively addressing the affordable housing crisis. With the COVID-19 pandemic, eviction moratoriums were vital for keeping families safe, stable, and housed. However, since the expiration of those moratoriums, evictions and rents have spiked.<sup>13</sup> Rising wealth inequality is fueling unchecked real estate speculation. Corporate landlords of all sizes have continued to expand their holdings, taking advantage of disasters to rent gouge and displace families. For-profit investors are turning our homes into investment vehicles at the expense of residents.<sup>14</sup>

Rent increases are a leading cause of rising homelessness.<sup>15</sup> Nationwide, communities are losing lower-priced housing to landlords' rent increases, faster than subsidized affordable housing can be built.<sup>16</sup> Corporate landlords, which are known to systematically hike rents and contribute to price appreciation, are expanding their reach in New Jersey, as well.<sup>17</sup> In Newark, institutional investors have concentrated purchases of 1-to-4 unit homes in Black neighborhoods.<sup>18</sup> These trends threaten to grow in Passaic, where from 2012 to 2022, the share of 1-to-4 unit properties owned by corporate investors nearly tripled.<sup>19</sup> Today, just six landlords own an estimated 10 percent of rental units in Passaic.<sup>20</sup> Corporate landlords file evictions against tenants at a higher rate than smaller landlords.<sup>21</sup> In Passaic County, evictions have skyrocketed from 2,652 filings in 2021, to 5,168 in 2022, and 6,745 in 2024.<sup>22</sup>

Rent stabilization is a proven solution to rising homelessness and displacement, that state and local governments have the power to implement swiftly



*Photos on pages 7, 10, 23 and 24: Tenants rally in Passaic, NJ, for fair rent and better conditions, September 2024. (Make the Road New Jersey)*

## PASSAIC COUNTY EVICTIONS 2021-2024



*Unique Eviction Filing by Vicinage, 2021-2025, New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, Office of Eviction Prevention (April 24, 2025)*

and immediately – despite budget constraints and a lack of federal funding.<sup>23</sup> In recent years, housing justice movements have been making headway and winning improved rent regulations. In 2020, Newark implemented a pandemic moratorium on rent increases;<sup>24</sup> in 2023, it expanded its rent regulations to include single-family homes, and to ban “unconscionable” increases in newer apartments built within the last 30 years.<sup>25</sup> In 2022, Perth Amboy tenants won a lowered allowable rent increase.<sup>26</sup> Policymakers have heeded housing justice organizing and passed rent stabilization with vacancy control in Maryland, New York, and Maine, as well as a state-wide rent cap in Washington.<sup>27</sup>

The City of Passaic’s policymakers now have a historic opportunity to create a strong and effective rent stabilization policy that will benefit residents for decades to come. This report outlines the evidence on rent stabilization’s benefits, and provides policy recommendations to strengthen this vital protection in Passaic.







## Terms

### **Rent Stabilization or Rent Control:**

Regulations that limit rent increases in private rental housing, usually by setting a maximum percentage of rent increase that is allowed each year, while ensuring that landlords receive a fair return on their investment. This helps create a predictable schedule for rent increases.

### **Vacancy Control:**

An element of rent stabilization policy that limits rent increases both within and between tenancies, even when tenants change or move out. This restricts rent increases regardless of tenant turnover. In contrast, **vacancy decontrol** enables landlords to increase the rent without any limit, when tenants move out. Without vacancy control, landlords are incentivized to evict tenants or discriminate against longer-term tenants; and over time, rents in stabilized units come to resemble market rate units.



## HOUSING UNAFFORDABILITY IN PASSAIC, NEW JERSEY

Passaic is the third-largest city in Passaic County, located at the county's southeast corner on the banks of the Passaic River. Passaic County, like other areas of New Jersey, is a county of extremes: it ranges from the post-industrial cities of Passaic and Paterson to the forested hills of West Milford, just twenty miles to the northwest. The City of Passaic has a median annual household income of \$50,893,<sup>28</sup> but the neighboring City of Clifton has a median income over 94 percent higher.<sup>29</sup> Wayne Township, just 8 miles away, has a median annual household income of \$151,561, almost three times the median in the City of Passaic.<sup>30</sup> Income and wealth in Passaic County vary not just geographically, but also racially and ethnically. The homeownership rate among White households in Passaic County is 74 percent.<sup>31</sup> In contrast, the rate among Latine households is a mere 31 percent.<sup>32</sup>

**Passaic is a city of renters: 73 percent of housing units are rentals, one of the highest rates in the state.**<sup>33</sup>

Passaic's renter households number about 15,600.<sup>34</sup> Latine residents make up a disproportionate number of renters: 73 percent of Passaic's population, but 83 percent of renter households, are Latine.<sup>35</sup> Most renter households in Passaic are low-income, and a striking number are extremely low-income: 19 percent of Passaic renter households have annual household incomes of less than \$20,000, and an additional 20 percent have annual household incomes between \$20,000 and \$35,000.<sup>36</sup>

**Eighty-one percent of Passaic's extremely low-income families are forced to pay unaffordable rent,** meaning they spend over 30 percent of their family income on rent.<sup>37</sup> In short, many families – especially the poorest – pay exorbitant portions of their income to keep a roof over their heads.





*Tenants in Passaic suffer neglect even as landlords profit. (Make the Road New Jersey)*



Despite composing approximately 5 percent of New Jersey's population, Passaic County accounted for 7 percent of evictions filed in New Jersey in 2024.<sup>38</sup> The eviction rate, the number of eviction filings divided by the number of renter households, was 8 percent, and is on track to reach 9 percent in 2025.<sup>39</sup> These eviction filings are, of course, concentrated in the renter-heavy urban areas of the county. The vast majority of eviction filings are for alleged nonpayment of rent, particularly in a state like New Jersey with good-cause eviction.

Rent increases exceed wage growth, so that keeping up with the rent has become increasingly challenging – especially for low-income renters for whom rent makes up a greater portion of the household budget. Between 2021 and 2023, median rent in the City of Passaic increased an average of 4 percent annually.<sup>40</sup> Average weekly wages in Passaic County grew only 2 percent in total over the same period.<sup>41</sup> Although all renters feel the squeeze, the pressure on poorer

renters is even more severe. Tenants paying the lowest rents experienced larger rent increases than those in more expensive housing between 2021 and 2023: lower quartile contract rent increased an average of 7 percent annually in these years.<sup>42</sup> At the same time, since 2000, real wages have actually decreased by at least 5 percent for the bottom 50th percentile of Passaic County workers.<sup>43</sup>

**Besides rising rents, many Passaic renters, particularly poorer renters, deal with problems with conditions in their apartments.** At least 3,179 low- and moderate-income households currently live in deficient units, as defined in New Jersey's Affordable Housing Law.<sup>44</sup> Deficient housing is that which "is over 50 years and overcrowded, that lacks complete plumbing, or that lacks complete kitchen facilities."<sup>45</sup> The housing stock in Passaic is old, with 58 percent of rental units dating from 1939 or earlier.<sup>46</sup>



Passaic's struggles with adequate housing are not new. In August 1969, the city experienced five nights of unrest after the eviction of a mother and her eleven children from a slum apartment in the midst of rapid rent increases and pervasive poor conditions.<sup>47</sup> This unrest formed part of the impetus for the landlord-tenant reforms that swept New Jersey in the 1970s.<sup>48</sup> Among these reforms was the widespread enactment of rent control, with 110 municipalities, including Passaic, implementing rent control ordinances by 1977.<sup>49</sup>

However, the real estate industry fought to weaken rent regulations, and in December 1999, Passaic enacted permanent vacancy decontrol, dealing a serious blow to its rent stabilization policy.<sup>50</sup> From that date onwards – until the new rent stabilization ordinance that passed this year – new tenancies in Passaic have had no rent control protection.<sup>51</sup> That is, until recently, only tenants who lived in their units continuously from before 1999 could be protected by rent regulations.<sup>52</sup>

Since the 2008 foreclosure crisis, corporate landlords have increasingly bought up homes and apartments, particularly in Passaic's Black and Brown neighborhoods.<sup>53</sup> An estimated 10 percent of rental units in the City of Passaic are now owned by six landlords, and the top twenty landlords own over 20 percent of rental units.<sup>54</sup> Concentration of ownership appears even more extreme for larger apartment buildings. Focusing on buildings of five units or more, the largest landlord controls at least 249 units across 15 buildings, an estimated 4 percent of apartment-building units. The second largest holds 244 units across just 6 buildings. When it comes to apartment buildings, the top five landlords control over 17 percent of apartment units in Passaic.<sup>55</sup>

Landlords are quick to file for eviction to protect their speculative investments, especially because the costs of eviction filings are relatively low.<sup>56</sup> As mentioned, evictions are increasing. In Passaic, Make the Road New Jersey has worked with numerous tenants who faced eviction for nonpayment of rent, after their landlords imposed extreme rent increases. At one building, tenants received notices demanding increases of as much as 138 percent. These notices arrived in August 2024, following a mortgage refinancing in January 2024. In another example, tenants of a local

corporate landlord, which owns at least 65 properties in Passaic, have faced a variety of issues, including rent increases of hundreds of dollars, and eviction filings alleging nonpayment of a single month of rent several years ago. In the latter case, tenants had to incur the costs of tracing a money order, the stress of an eviction case, and risk being blacklisted for future housing, all because of the landlord's clerical error.<sup>57</sup> When landlords seek increased profits, cut corners, or expand beyond their capacity to manage their buildings, tenants suffer the consequences.

Passaic has recently introduced innovative policies to increase affordable housing supply. The city now requires new developments of five units or more to make at least fifteen percent of units affordable.<sup>58</sup> But although inclusionary zoning or affordable housing set-asides ensure that new development is not solely market-rate, the volume of new construction is low relative to what rent control can cover. Passaic has also amended its zoning code to permit accessory dwelling units (ADUs),<sup>59</sup> which are smaller dwellings built on the same lot as an existing, primary dwelling.<sup>60</sup> This zoning change is coupled with grants to encourage ADU construction and conversion, with new ADUs to be subject to a twenty-year deed restriction to maintain affordability.<sup>61</sup> These policies are designed to increase affordable housing supply, but their high affordability thresholds keep them out of reach of many Passaic households.<sup>62</sup> And unlike rent control, the number of units affected is very small.

In response to community concerns, the Passaic City Council recently amended the city's rent stabilization ordinance, enormously expanding the number of tenants protected by rent stabilization.<sup>63</sup> The mayor of Passaic, Hector Lora, acknowledged the prevalence of tenant complaints about exorbitant rent increases when he introduced the new legislation.<sup>64</sup> In January 2025, Passaic adopted rent stabilization measures limiting rent increases to 8 percent, in multifamily rentals built before 1978. Soon after, in February 2025, the city amended the ordinance, limiting rent increases to 6 percent plus a pass-through fee, that allows municipal property tax increases on landlords to be passed onto tenants.<sup>65</sup> The amended ordinance also includes a mechanism for allowing greater rent increases, of up to 20 percent annually, in units renting at "below-market" rates.<sup>66</sup>

# IMPACTS OF STRENGTHENING PASSAIC'S RENT STABILIZATION: WHO BENEFITS?

An estimated 9,800 tenant households,<sup>67</sup> out of Passaic's 15,600 total renter households,<sup>68</sup> are now covered by the city's new rent stabilization policy.<sup>69</sup> Renter households are mostly low-income, and disproportionately households of color.<sup>70</sup>

Passaic's rent stabilization ordinance currently protects against egregious rent gouging: it sets maximum permitted rent increases at 6 percent plus additional pass-through taxes. However, this limit is on the high-end of rent increases. Before the new regulations, median rent in Passaic increased an average of 4 percent annually from 2021-23<sup>71</sup> – well below today's cap of over 6 percent, but already a great strain to low-income households. If instead, policymakers lowered permitted rent increases to beneath 4 percent, this would much more effectively protect Passaic's renters, most of whom are already rent-burdened.<sup>72</sup>

**We estimate, if stronger rent stabilization only allowed landlords to increase the rent by a maximum of 3 percent annually, this would put over \$4 million more back in the pockets of the city's renters each year – including \$3.5 million in the pockets of low-income households.**<sup>73</sup>

**If Passaic strengthens its rent stabilization ordinance, this has the potential to protect over 4,000 households from homelessness.**<sup>74</sup> Many, 38 percent, of Passaic's renter households are extremely low-income; while 4,560 renter households are severely cost-burdened, spending the majority of their income on housing.<sup>75</sup> These precarious households are one unexpected emergency away from becoming unhoused.

Evictions in Passaic County have skyrocketed in recent years.<sup>76</sup> Corporate landlords are known to evict tenants at a higher rate, and based on available court records, this is apparently the case in Passaic County, as well.<sup>77</sup> Most evictions are for nonpayment of rent. Stronger rent stabilization is critical to protect Passaic's communities from predatory landlords.



## Stronger Rent Control Is Needed to Protect Workers

"The majority of what I earn goes to rent," says U.A., who lives in Passaic with his family. "All we ask for is a fair chance." The inflation of the last few years, coupled with stagnant wages, has reduced the quantity and quality of food that U.A. can provide for his family. "Before, with 50 dollars I could fill the refrigerator and feed my children well. Today, the same amount doesn't even cover the basics." Strengthening rent control would provide stability for U.A. and his three children, and an opportunity to reach beyond the basics once again.

Stephanie's family struggles to afford the \$1,600 of monthly rent for their 3-bedroom apartment and over \$900 in other monthly bills. Six adults share the apartment, four of them working to cover their household's needs. Rent is their biggest expense. Stephanie's mother works 10.5-hour days at a hair salon. Her stepfather works six days a week at a bagel shop, at minimum wage – \$15.49 an hour. Stephanie and her brother also work, but do not earn enough to move out.

With everyone chipping in, they are able to save a little each month, but only by forgoing healthcare and other needs. Stronger rent control with a 3 percent maximum rent increase would save her family an additional \$600 annually. Stephanie says: "We would be able to save this money for an emergency fund, or for regular check-ups to the doctor, because my mom's health is not good."

"Stronger rent stabilization would make life here not only more affordable, but more stable," she explains. "Right now, the constant pressure of making ends meet weighs heavily on me." With New Jersey's minimum wage pegged to increases in the Consumer Price Index, uncontrolled rents become increasingly unaffordable for minimum-wage workers.



# WHY RENT STABILIZATION?

Across the country, rent stabilization is a critical and effective tool that provides tenants and communities far-reaching benefits. Rent stabilization increases housing stability and affordability for current tenants. And this in turn has a positive ripple-effect on communities, boosting economic well-being and local economies, health, educational attainment, environmental sustainability, and civic engagement.<sup>78</sup>

Rent stabilization's wide and immediate reach makes it a critical policy for stopping the bleeding – preventing evictions, homelessness, and displacement – as longer-term solutions, like increasing our deeply and permanently affordable housing stock, are more gradually put in place.

Nationwide, since 2013, we have lost over 2.5 million lower-priced homes, renting at below \$600 per month – in large part due to landlords' rent increases.<sup>79</sup> Moreover, 1 in 4 renter households can only afford rents in this price bracket.<sup>80</sup> Yet we haven't built enough affordable housing to make up for this hemorrhage. In 2025, developers are projected to complete only 78,000 subsidized homes aimed at lower-income households.<sup>81</sup> Rent control is a smart and pragmatic policy for safe-guarding the currently lower-cost and affordable housing we do have.

Rent stabilization is also a winning issue with voters, popular among both renters and homeowners. National polls consistently find an overwhelming majority of voters across party affiliation support rent stabilization: for instance, one 2024 poll found that 78 percent of renters (and 67 percent of homeowners) were more likely to vote for a candidate who supports rent stabilization.<sup>82</sup> In Passaic, of the city's 31,943 potential voters, 73 percent are renters.<sup>83</sup>



## The Need for Government Regulation Against Speculation On Our Homes

Rents are not simply set based on supply and demand.<sup>84</sup> Rather, our rents are influenced by a host of factors including the unequal power relation between landlords and tenants, profiteering by third-party investors, and speculation. Today, billionaires are buying up our homes and holding them vacant, to profit by flipping properties and treating them as mere investment vehicles.<sup>85</sup> Simply increasing supply, particularly through for-profit developers, is not the answer – much newly built housing is wildly unaffordable and would take decades to “trickle down” in price, if ever.<sup>86</sup>

Our communities are losing their existing lower-priced housing stock to landlords' rent hikes, faster than they can build subsidized housing to make up for this loss. Policymakers must use rent stabilization to preserve the existing lower-cost housing we do have and keep families in place, while expanding our deeply affordable housing stock through not-for-profit development.

## Stability and Affordability

**Rent stabilization works:** studies agree it is effective at immediately improving housing stability and affordability for current tenants.

**Tenants living in rent-controlled units move less frequently and are less likely to be forced to move.**<sup>87</sup>

For instance, immediately after Los Angeles adopted rent control, the share of renters who moved in the last year decreased by 37 percent. What's more, moving rates dropped the most for Black and Latine renters.<sup>88</sup>

**Rent stabilization helps people stay in their homes longer.**<sup>89</sup> In New York City, tenants in rent-regulated units were three times as likely as those in market-rate units to have lived in their homes for 20 years or more (23 percent compared with 7 percent). In Manhattan they were 10 times as likely to have that length of tenure (35 percent compared with 3 percent).<sup>90</sup>

**The stability created by rent regulations disproportionately benefits low-income households, people of color, seniors, and families with children,** who are most at risk of displacement, forced moves, and their negative consequences.<sup>91</sup> Rent stabilization is a main factor allowing low-income households of color, from San Francisco to New York City, to continue living in their gentrifying neighborhoods.<sup>92</sup>

**In cities with rent regulations, median rents in stabilized units are hundreds of dollars cheaper than those in unregulated units.** Stabilized tenants pay substantially less than tenants in non-regulated units: e.g., \$3,650 less per year in Los Angeles, \$6,000 in New York City, over \$6,440 in Santa Monica, and \$18,000 in high-cost Manhattan.<sup>93</sup> Rent stabilization slows down the growth in rents – so that regulated rents are as much as 44 to 52 percent less than unregulated, market-rate units.<sup>94</sup> The savings are even greater when stabilized rents are compared to market-rate asking rents that are advertised for vacant units.

**Rent stabilization helps preserve affordability in gentrifying neighborhoods.** During the late 1990s, rent for unregulated apartments in New York City's

gentrifying neighborhoods increased by an average of 43 percent—compared to 11 percent for rent stabilized apartments in these neighborhoods.<sup>95</sup>

**The immediate savings that rent stabilization provides tenants are critical.** Rent stabilization's predictable and more affordable rents help protect tenants against homelessness. In the longer-term, strong rent stabilization has allowed tenants to afford healthcare and child-rearing costs, to save for retirement, to plan for the future – and to make important life choices for their long-term well-being, such as changing jobs or careers, going to school while working, choosing fulfilling but lower-paying work, or starting a small business.<sup>96</sup> Rent stabilization can support tenants in achieving professional and economic mobility, for instance by completing schooling while working, or saving for opportunities.<sup>97</sup> Too often tenants are caught up simply trying to secure the present. Rent stabilization provides tenants the financial flexibility to plan and pursue better futures.

**Rent stabilization is most effective, however, when it is strong: with vacancy control, and permitted maximum increases below the rate of inflation.** In the 1970s, many localities initially adopted rent control with vacancy control, but in the 1990s, the real estate industry fought to roll this back through statewide pre-emptions that imposed vacancy *decontrol*. Under vacancy decontrol, landlords can increase rents without limit when tenants move out.

Numerous studies have tracked the benefits of vacancy control to renters, and the harms of decontrol.<sup>98</sup> For instance:

- In Springfield, New Jersey, rents increased an average of 56 percent after vacancy decontrol.<sup>99</sup>
- In Santa Monica, with vacancy control, rents for 83 percent of controlled units were affordable to households that were low, very low, and extremely low income. But after vacancy decontrol, less than 4 percent of stabilized rental units still remain affordable to these households.<sup>100</sup>



- In California, vacancy decontrol contributed to the displacement of Black renters. Before vacancy decontrol, the share of Black renters increased in California cities with strong rent control. But after vacancy deregulations, the share of Black renters decreased, as landlords priced out Black tenants.<sup>101</sup>

Lack of vacancy control is linked to a higher eviction rate, both since rents are less affordable, and because landlords are incentivized to push tenants out, so they can increase the rent without limit.<sup>102</sup>

An appropriately low rent cap is also critical to ensuring rent stabilization is effective. Capping allowed rent increases below the rate of inflation better benefits precarious tenants, generally without hurting the returns of landlords:

- Landlord costs typically increase at less than the increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI); studies have found that a third to half of landlord costs were unaffected by inflation. Thus, a rent increase equal to the CPI generally overcompensates landlords for their increased costs.<sup>103</sup>
- A recent study in Minneapolis found that limiting rent increases to 75 percent of CPI would allow returns to landlords comparable to those of average and median rent increases in the uncontrolled market. Limiting rent increases to CPI plus 3 percent would allow returns comparable to high-end rent increases in the existing market; and a rent cap of CPI plus 7 percent would allow profits far in excess of what landlords actually achieved at the top of the market.<sup>104</sup>



## Building Community Resilience

For Victor, high rents are not just an issue for individual families, but for the community as a whole. “If parents didn’t have to work excessively just to pay for rent, they could spend more time with their families and provide the support their children need,” he says.

Victor has lived in Passaic since age 16. His spouse is a teacher, but with two breadwinners, they still spend nearly half of their income on rent. They pay over \$2,400 monthly for a 2-bedroom that is home to their five children.

Whereas under the current rent stabilization law’s permitted annual rent increase of over 6 percent, Victor might have to pay nearly \$2,000 more in rent next year, in comparison, stronger rent stabilization limiting rent increases to 3 percent would put \$900 back in his pocket. “I can put the money towards college for my kids,” he says.

With rents rising faster than wages, parents are forced to work more and more hours to keep a roof over their family’s heads. Rent control helps keep housing costs in line with income and gives families the opportunity to plan for the future.

“Rent doesn’t work for people with minimum wage, it’s pretty sad,” says Victor. He loves that in his neighborhood, “People are outgoing, if you need something they want to help. That’s why I don’t want to move. I’ll miss the community if I have to move, the food, the culture.”

Photos on pages 13 and 16: Tenants and their supporters rally for better conditions and an end to excessive rent increases in Passaic, NJ, September 2024. (Make the Road New Jersey)

## Reaching Those in Need

Rent stabilization is vital for – and disproportionately benefits – those most harmed by rising rents and displacement, including low-income people, communities of color, seniors, people living with chronic illness or disability, immigrants, women-headed households, and families with children.<sup>105</sup>

Throughout the country, rent-stabilized households are majority or disproportionately low-income.<sup>106</sup> In New Jersey, New York, California, and elsewhere, people of color disproportionately live in homes or communities with rent stabilization.<sup>107</sup> Where it exists, rent stabilization helps keep marginalized communities of color in place. Immigrants are more likely to rent in the private market, because they are not eligible for government housing assistance.<sup>108</sup>

Universal policies like rent stabilization can be more effective at promoting large-scale social equity than means-tested policies that are only available to a small fraction of those in need. Rent control is accessible to those facing application barriers, and it effectively reaches people who are barred from government-subsidized affordable housing, including many immigrant households.<sup>109</sup>

It is important, however, to note that rent control is most effective at reaching those most in need when it is strong, with vacancy control and low permitted increases (see pages 12-13).



### Caring for Children and Elders

Family circumstances dictate Clariza's budget. With an elderly mother and an 18-year-old daughter in high school, Clariza is solely responsible for the family's rent of over \$2,000 per month. "For my well-being as well as that of my daughter," says Clariza, "I hope that the cost of living can be lowered."

## Community-Wide Benefits

When renters thrive, they lift up their communities. Stable, affordable housing offers far-reaching benefits that ripple across society.

- **Fighting Speculation on Our Homes.** Rent stabilization helps to counter profiteering and predatory profit-seeking, such as that by corporate landlords which target low-income communities of color for rent hikes and evictions.<sup>110</sup> By curbing bad actors and dampening their expansion in the real estate market, it helps level the playing field for landlords, developers, and investors who are good actors.
- **Community Wealth-Building & Stronger Local Economies.** Rent stabilization supports inclusive prosperity, redirecting resources back into our communities rather than to line the pockets of real estate speculators. When low-income households gain income, they are more likely than higher-income households to actually spend these extra funds – creating local business activity, jobs, and tax revenues.<sup>111</sup> Rising rents are a major driver of inflation, particularly for lower-income people;<sup>112</sup> rent stabilization helps dampen inflation, in a manner that helps foster economic and racial equity. Rent stabilization allows low-wage workers, including those performing undervalued care work, to remain in higher cost areas and benefit from the hard-fought gains of increased minimum wage. It can improve employee retention,<sup>113</sup> and help small businesses remain in operation by keeping their customer base and workforce in place.<sup>114</sup>
- **Healthier People and Communities.** Stable, affordable housing is absolutely critical for health. A 2018 study of more than 22,000 low-income renter households in five cities found that, controlling for other factors, just being behind in rent was associated with poor caregiver health, maternal depressive symptoms, and increased child lifetime hospitalizations.<sup>115</sup> National research has found a 10-point increase in rent burden was associated with an 8 percent higher risk of death.<sup>116</sup> People having trouble paying rent are twice as likely to take sick days, and their children are at risk of developmental delays.<sup>117</sup> Rent-burdened families



are also forced to make unhealthy trade-offs, giving up nutritious food, medicine, and healthcare, in order to afford rent, and suffering worse health outcomes as a result.<sup>118</sup> In contrast, when low-income families pay rents they can afford, they are able to spend four times as much on healthcare, and 50 percent more on food, compared to their severely cost-burdened peers—making them more likely to get healthcare and necessary medication.<sup>119</sup> Eviction is a public health crisis. Even the threat of displacement harms health, and the health consequences of forced moves are long-term.<sup>120</sup> Studies have found that forced moves are linked to nutritional deficiency, low birthweight and other health challenges for children, and can be fatal for seniors and those with disability or chronic illness.<sup>121</sup> Homelessness catastrophically erodes health and increases mortality,<sup>122</sup> and rent increases are a key driver of homelessness.<sup>123</sup>

- **Improved Educational Outcomes.** Housing stability increases school attendance and promotes educational attainment. Children who move frequently have more absences, lower likelihood of finishing school, lower test scores, and educational delays.<sup>124</sup> With every move, a student loses an estimated three to six months of education, resulting in delayed literacy and skills.<sup>125</sup> Rent stabilization also helps teachers who are increasingly underpaid and rent-burdened to continue in their profession. A national survey found one in four former teachers would consider returning to teaching if offered housing incentives.<sup>126</sup>
- **Climate-friendly Development & Disaster Response Without Displacement.** Strong rent regulations are necessary for preventing displacement after disasters, when landlords and speculative investors have taken advantage of the lack of housing to price gouge. Rent stabilization also helps prevent costs of green upgrades from burdening renters, by ensuring landlords pay their fair share.<sup>127</sup> Anti-displacement policies like rent stabilization are needed to realize the equity and environmental benefits of transit-oriented development. Low-income households use transit more than wealthier households, so when transit-rich areas gentrify and low-income households are replaced by higher income households, transit ridership decreases and car usage increases.<sup>128</sup> Displaced low-income workers

often commute longer distances, typically by car, because they are still tied to jobs and services in the urban centers from which they were displaced.<sup>129</sup>

- **Civic Engagement & Inclusive Democracy.** Stable, affordable housing allows renters additional time and resources to participate politically, volunteer, and give back to their communities. A study in Atlanta found that gentrification is linked to decreased voter turnout among historically disenfranchised groups.<sup>130</sup> A national study in 2023 also links evictions to decreased voting.<sup>131</sup> Rent stabilization fosters more resilient communities of color, by helping anchor these communities in place, thus guarding their political representation, cultural and civic institutions, and small businesses. And rent control helps communities develop stronger social safety nets, as renters put down long-term roots. When renters can stay in their homes, they deepen social ties with their neighbors and local communities, deepening networks with nearby friends who can help with healthcare, childcare, or other needs.



## Healthy Futures

Rosa has been a resident of Passaic for over twenty years. She works full-time making minimum wage, and the stress of making next month's rent dominates her life: "I live with constant stress, to the point that many nights I can't sleep."

She wishes she could provide more support for her children studying at college, and extracurricular activities for her younger daughter, but there simply isn't room in her household budget. Rosa says controlling rent costs would allow her to support her children and provide them the opportunities they deserve. With a 3 percent limit on rent increases, she would be able to save several hundred dollars extra a year for her children's college fund: "Rent stabilization is important because I would have that peace of mind, to save money for my younger children to have access to higher education someday."

## Policy Advantages: Speed, Scale & Cost-Effectiveness

As a policy, rent stabilization has practical advantages. Its speed and scale are unrivaled by other policy options: it has the ability to swiftly impact the majority of low-income renters.<sup>132</sup> It has tremendous reach because it governs private rental housing. Therefore, ensuring rent stabilization is strong and without loopholes, is particularly important to fulfill its power to have a broad positive impact.

As mentioned, Passaic's rent stabilization ordinance covers as many as 9,800 households. In contrast, Passaic has just 384 units of public housing and 952 units of subsidized affordable housing.<sup>133</sup> If Passaic expanded its rent-stabilization to cover single-family rentals and all duplexes, this would protect an estimated 2,600 more households.<sup>134</sup>

Rent control is also cost-effective. In many localities, rent stabilization is administered by rent boards that are fully or largely financially self-sufficient. In Santa Monica and Berkeley, for example, rent boards do not draw from cities' general funds, but cover all operating costs from fees set yearly to match projected

expenses. Santa Monica raised its rent board budget of over \$5 million in 2018 by charging landlords a monthly registration fee of \$16.50 per unit; the board has 25 full-time staff to ensure implementation and enforcement, overseeing over 27,000 units.<sup>135</sup> In the short-term, rent boards may have limited startup costs. Other affordable housing policies – such as vouchers, construction, and rehabilitation of deeply affordable housing – are also direly needed, but far more expensive than rent control. By preserving affordability on a widespread basis, rent stabilization helps local governments stretch limited funds for subsidized housing much further.

The costs of preventing homelessness through policies like rent stabilization far outweighs the cost of homelessness to city budgets. The cost of leaving a person out on the street is over \$35,000 per year—money that is largely spent on publicly funded crisis services such as emergency medical treatment.<sup>136</sup> The Urban Institute estimated that housing insecurity and eviction costs cities millions annually in homeless services, unpaid utilities, and more.<sup>137</sup>



### Helping Passaic Thrive

Stephanie has lived in Passaic for twenty years, since age two. “I grew up with a community that is very diverse,” she reflects, “but you see a lot of common faces everyday. That familiarity of people brings a feeling you’re at home, that this is your community. All these people you talk to and engage with frequently, having these places to go to – restaurants, schools, parks... It’s a good community. It would be challenging trying to leave a community you’ve grown up in, just because housing isn’t affordable. The solution isn’t about going somewhere else, but staying and making it a more livable place.”

She adds, “Sometimes there’s a negative reputation, it’s a bad environment here or dangerous – but those things come about when there’s a lack of support for the community.” Rent stabilization is a safety net that helps nurture the community’s resilience to stressors.







## The Truth About Rent Stabilization

Rent stabilization's main purposes are to stabilize rent, combat rampant speculation in the rental market, and help decrease the power imbalance between landlords and tenants. Rent stabilization is also the subject of much public debate, which often has not focused on its direct benefits to tenants, or its effectiveness in stabilizing rents. The real estate industry has invested millions of dollars into misinformation campaigns and fear-mongering to malign rent stabilization.<sup>138</sup>

We address misconceptions here. Scholars and economists have called for an evidence-based approach, to better understand rent stabilization's real-world impacts.<sup>139</sup>

### Rent stabilization...

**Does not decrease construction.** In general, other factors—including overall market conditions and zoning—have far more influence over new housing supply than the presence of rent regulations.<sup>140</sup> Multiple studies of rent control across the country have found no discernible impact on construction rates.<sup>141</sup> Moreover, New Jersey's state-wide law exempts buildings built in the last 30 years from rent stabilization, and so new construction is not impacted.

**Is not the chief cause of rents increasing in unregulated units,** and can even be protective against such increases. In Massachusetts (before it was abolished), California, and New Jersey, rent control either slightly increased affordability in non-controlled units or slowed growth in median rent overall.<sup>142</sup> One study of rent control in San Francisco found that landlords converting their buildings to condos or otherwise removing them from the rental stock led to a decline in supply and an increase in rents—suggesting that the problem is not rent control itself but loopholes that need to be closed.<sup>143</sup>

**Effectively reaches low-income and marginalized tenants.** Rent stabilization disproportionately benefits those most harmed by rising rents and displacement, including low-income people, communities of color, seniors, people living with chronic illness or disability, immigrants, women-headed households, and families with children.<sup>144</sup> In cities where it exists, rent stabilization is the largest source of housing for low-income people – housing more low-income families than public and subsidized housing combined.

**Allows landlords fair returns on their investments.** Rather than causing landlords undue hardship, even strong rent controls allow landlords fair profits. Scenario modeling of rental housing in Minneapolis over a 10-year investment horizon found that rent caps *at and even below* the Consumer Price Index would have allowed industry-standard returns on investment.<sup>145</sup>

# Strengthening Passaic's Rent Stabilization: Policy Recommendations



Passaic's 2025 rent stabilization ordinance is a historic step to protect renters, since the city's rollback of rent control in 1999. However, Passaic's current rent regulations can be strengthened further. In light of this report's findings, policymakers should:



## Lower permitted increases to 3% or the CPI, whichever is lower

Rent stabilization policies should set the maximum allowed increase to a rate lower than inflation, or the Consumer Price Index (CPI), to best protect tenants. Doing so would not necessarily hurt returns to most landlords (see page 17). Due to high inflation, some jurisdictions using a CPI-based cap have amended their formula to include a maximum cap that applies whenever CPI is too high. Rising rents are a major driver of inflation, and slowing rent increases to below CPI would help dampen inflation.

Passaic still permits an annual rent increase rate – 6 percent, plus fees for taxes on landlords – which is on the extreme high end, compared to rent stabilization ordinances in New Jersey and throughout the U.S. Only four other New Jersey municipalities with rent stabilization allow rent increases of 6 percent or more.<sup>146</sup> Instead, most pin permitted increases to the CPI or inflation, often with a maximum cap that kicks in when inflation is too high.<sup>147</sup> Passaic's previous rent stabilization law limits increases to CPI.<sup>148</sup> New York City limits annual rent increases to 2.75 percent in units with 1-year leases; and recognizing that inflation is skyrocketing, Los Angeles limits rent increases to 60 percent of CPI or 3 percent, whichever is less.<sup>149</sup>

Wage growth in Passaic County is far lower than 6 percent per year.<sup>150</sup> Thus, Passaic's large permitted increase guarantees that housing will remain unaffordable to working families, enabling displacement. Instead, Passaic should lower the maximum permitted rent increase to 3 percent annually, or a portion of the CPI, whichever is less.







## Require vacancy control

Rent stabilization must include vacancy control, to be effective at maintaining housing affordability and stability in the longer-term. Vacancy control means that limits on rent increases apply both within and between tenancies, even when tenants move out. Without vacancy control, landlords may raise the rent to market rate or without any limit, when tenants move out. Landlords are incentivized to harass and evict tenants, and to discriminate against longer-term tenants, so they can raise the rent without limit. Without vacancy control, rents in stabilized units increasingly resemble market-rate rents over time.<sup>151</sup>

Passaic allows unlimited rent increases whenever tenants move out. Passaic should instead adopt vacancy control, to limit rent increases both between and within tenancies.

Data from New Jersey and California shows that vacancy control is vital to keeping low-income renters housed and protecting communities of color like those in Passaic from displacement (see pages 12-13). Cities throughout New Jersey, like Newark and Union City, as well as New York City, Montgomery and Prince George's Counties in Maryland, and Portland, Maine, have vacancy control.



## Remove "Below Market Rate" increases

Rent stabilization should not allow higher rent increases on lower-rent units. This especially hurts the lowest-income tenants who can least afford these. Rent stabilization should also avoid loopholes including that allow deregulation, and should minimize pass-through of capital improvements, property taxes, or utility costs to tenants.

Passaic's new ordinance contains a loophole allowing increases of up to 20 percent annually, for units deemed below the "Low HOME Rent Limit." This allows landlords to target the poorest, most low-income tenants for the highest rent increases.

- The "Low HOME Rent Limit" is set based on median incomes for all of Bergen and Passaic Counties, but this geography, as a whole, is far more affluent than the City of Passaic.<sup>152</sup> As a result, the "Low HOME Rent Limit" creates an artificially high, mis-matched rent floor when applied to Passaic. On top of this, the "Low HOME Rent Limit" is designed to be affordable to families whose incomes are 50 percent of AMI; and hence, it is by definition unaffordable to poorer and extremely low-income households.



...

- Passaic’s existing lower-rent and more affordable units are not actually “below market rate”: since the vast majority of the cities’ units fell out of rent control after 1999, current rents are already market rents.
- Rather, this loophole allows landlords to drastically increase rents in existing low-rent and affordable housing, towards an inflated benchmark set based on rents in more affluent areas. It enables the gentrification and displacement of the most vulnerable, low-income households – the very families whom rent stabilization should most protect.
- Landlords can claim this loophole and seek a 20 percent rent increase if they demonstrate a lack of health or code violations. However, this in itself does nothing to improve habitability while keeping tenants in place. Also, landlords should not require the “incentive” of rent increases, to uphold basic habitability standards. Rather, the city must enforce habitability as a given.

Passaic must remove the loophole for “below market rate” increases, to ensure rent stabilization reaches the low-income tenants whom it should most protect.



## Cover More Properties

Rent stabilization should aim to cover as much of the rental stock as possible. Many traditional exemptions no longer reflect the current conditions of our housing market, and should be updated accordingly.

Nationally, renters in two-to-four-unit buildings have the lowest median household income, with Black and Brown tenants renting 44 percent of these units;<sup>153</sup> exempting these smaller apartments from rent stabilization has a disproportionately harmful impact on low-income renters and renters of color. Single-family rentals are also a growing part of housing stock, increasingly owned by corporate landlords that evict and rent gouge tenants at a high rate.<sup>154</sup> In 2023, Newark’s rent stabilization covered 70 percent of units, and it expanded its rent regulations further to include single-family homes.<sup>155</sup>

Subsidized housing, unfortunately, has become increasingly beholden to for-profit investors and landlords who fail to keep it deeply affordable for residents. In Antioch, CA, tenants in subsidized housing under the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program won rent control. In LIHTC housing, for-profit investors receive government tax breaks, in order to invest in building housing with temporary affordability requirements. However, the





affordability requirements for LIHTC rents set these based on area median income (AMI); as a larger area gentrifies, LIHTC rents are allowed to increase, even if low-income tenants' actual incomes do not keep up. Rent stabilization has proven necessary for subsidized housing residents because LIHTC rents based on AMI were increasing at a rate they could not actually afford.<sup>156</sup>

"New construction" exemptions are a misnomer, as over time, the buildings exempted are decades old and no longer new housing stock. Moreover, this exemption may largely be unnecessary, as studies show rent stabilization does not dampen housing production. Multifamily underwriting standards typically assume that rent will grow only 3 percent annually – well within the allowed rent increases of many rent control policies.<sup>157</sup> The burden of proving financial hardship and petitioning for a new construction exemption should be on landlords, rather than assumed. Exemptions of new construction are also discriminatory against people with disabilities, because most accessible housing is newer.<sup>158</sup> In Portland, ME, voters passed a rent cap of 70 percent of CPI in 2020, with no new construction exemption, and the city continues to have a thriving development ecosystem.<sup>159</sup>

Passaic exempts all single-family homes and owner-occupied duplexes. But as many as 15 percent of rental properties may be single-family rentals (SFRs), and roughly 45 percent might be duplexes, many of which could be misclassified as owner-occupied. If Passaic covered all rental units in duplexes, approximately 3,300 more homes would be stabilized.<sup>160</sup>

Passaic exempts properties built after 1978 – thus exempting all buildings less than 47 years old. Approximately 14 percent of all residential units are built after 1978.<sup>161</sup> What's more, Passaic's exemption for newer buildings is in excess of New Jersey's state-wide law, which preemptively exempts buildings under 30 years old. If Passaic simply aligned its exemption for newer buildings with New Jersey's state-wide law, this would cover an additional 8 percent of all residential units, approximately 1,500 more homes.<sup>162</sup> Covering all rental properties, or adopting a rolling date for new construction, better protects tenants and ensures rent stabilization remains effective long-term.





## Ensure Habitability Without Displacement

Rent stabilization should work hand-in-hand with well-designed code enforcement policies which compel landlords to maintain safe and habitable housing, while keeping current tenants in place. Rent stabilization policy can serve as a vehicle for improving habitability, when it includes infrastructure that allows tenants to make individual or collective complaints, and to seek rent decreases for health and safety violations.<sup>163</sup>

Tenants should have the right to withhold rent for habitability violations, and if code violations are brought before a rent control board, evictions should be barred. Rent stabilization should include escrow provisions that allow tenants to contest rent increases and withhold rent without retaliation. Tenants must be protected against landlord retaliation for making complaints, withholding rent until repairs are made, organizing, or otherwise asserting their rights under the law. New Jersey provides state-wide just cause eviction protections,<sup>164</sup> as well as some protections against harassment,<sup>165</sup> and these can be further enhanced locally.<sup>166</sup>

Passaic's ordinance currently does not include remedies for tenants facing health and safety violations, such as the option to withhold rent or seek compensation. Instead, it should provide strong protections for tenants who suffer habitability violations or withhold rent due to these. Passaic should also create a clear and accessible process for tenants to seek remedy, and withhold or decrease rent payments when faced with such violations.



## Strengthen Tenant-Centered Implementation, Oversight, & Enforcement

The strongest implementation of rent control requires a coordinated infrastructure of institutions for accountability, enforcement, public education, and transparency. Rent control boards should be designed to allow for effective oversight and tenant leadership. Publicly accessible rental registries, particularly those that track beneficial ownership, rents, fees, turnover, and eviction, are also critical for transparency and enforcement.

- In Berkeley, CA, the Rent Control Board is elected and includes tenant leaders. The Board conducts and publishes a regular survey of tenants in rent-stabilized housing, that provides detailed demographic data, information on rents, and evidence of vacancy decontrol's harmful impacts.<sup>167</sup>





- In New York City, rent regulation laws require survey data collection and publication about every three years, offering an important picture of policy areas for improvement.<sup>168</sup>
- In Santa Monica, CA, an elected Rent Board is compensated \$75 per meeting, and oversees implementation, holds hearings, and files lawsuits against landlords. Small per unit fees paid by landlords and tenants fund a Rent Control Agency (RCA) with a staff of 25, which maintains a registry of all rent-controlled units, pursues delinquent registration fees, publishes annual reports, and runs a Rent Control Office (RCO). The RCO answers questions from landlords and tenants, publishes a newsletter mailed twice a year to tenants, and conducts outreach. A Public Rights Division (PRD) under the City Attorney takes tenant complaints and can initiate legal action against a landlord on behalf of the city. Code enforcement officers are trained on tenant harassment protections and can issue citations that may become part of a PRD lawsuit.<sup>169</sup>

Passaic's ordinance creates an appointed Rent Leveling Board, but more robust infrastructure is needed for implementation, accountability, and effective enforcement. The city should set clear guidelines on rent decreases and relief for tenants who experience habitability violations or service cuts. To improve transparency and implementation, other municipalities have created rental registries that track beneficial ownership; as well as rent control agencies staffed through a per unit fee on landlords and tenants, to conduct public education, monitoring, and enforcement. City attorneys can file lawsuits against violating landlords on behalf of the public, and code inspection processes can support such lawsuits.







## CONCLUSION

The economic well-being and health of Passaic depends on the well-being of its renters and low-income residents. Policymakers have the opportunity to collaborate with residents, tenant groups, and unhoused organizations to strengthen Passaic's rent stabilization policy and close loopholes.

The stakes are sweeping, and so is the upside: stronger rent stabilization will immediately benefit thousands of renter households in Passaic, putting millions of dollars back into these families' pockets and boosting our communities' resilience.

To complement rent-stabilization, the City of Passaic must also strengthen code enforcement, mechanisms for enforcing rent stabilization, and

community education on tenant rights. It should pass tenant protections such as right to counsel, and a tenant and community opportunity to purchase act (TOPA/COPA).<sup>170</sup> The city must take steps to protect tenants from all forms of harassment and discrimination, including retaliatory eviction filings, discriminatory threats of immigration enforcement, and source of income discrimination. In the longer-run, the city can explore means of expanding its subsidized affordable housing stock, including through the use of acquisitions and conversions through TOPA/COPA, tax foreclosures, or code enforcement; public land banking; and financing affordable housing trust funds through progressive taxation or taxes on vacant properties.



# APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY

## Methodology for Estimating Rent-Stabilized Households, Savings to Stabilized Tenants, Ownership Concentration, and Other Property Analysis

Property assessment records were downloaded from the [Passaic County tax data portal](#) in May 2025, and processed in OpenRefine to extract unit counts where available. We inferred owner occupancy based on whether the property address and owner's mailing address matched.

For the universe of rental units, we examined class 2 (residential properties of 1-4 units), class 4C (apartments of 5 or more units), and class 4A (commercial properties with apartment units) buildings in the property assessment data. To estimate total rental units, we counted units in these classes, except for owner-occupied units. For estimates of single-family rentals, we counted 1-units that are not owner-occupied.

To estimate the number of rent-stabilized households, we counted residential units in properties built before 1978, except for 1-unit residences (single-family homes and condos), and owner-occupied duplexes.

To calculate aggregate savings to stabilized tenants, we took the difference between a 6 percent versus 3 percent annual rent increase, applied to the median monthly rent (\$1,230 in 2023 for the City of Passaic according to 1-year ACS data), to first calculate annual savings per household. We then multiplied by the estimated number of stabilized households, to calculate aggregate annual savings. To calculate savings to low-income stabilized tenants, we multiplied the former aggregate savings by 80 percent, the proportion of renters households in the City of Passaic who are low-income, according to CHAS data for 2017-2021.

To analyze ownership, we used owner mailing address to infer when properties have the same owner. With the unit data that was available, we created a ranking of landlords with the most rental units.

## Eviction Data

A sample of eviction filings between January and May 2025 was cross-referenced against [county tax records](#), [property records](#), and [eviction filings](#) to identify corporate landlords among the plaintiffs

## Data.census.gov Place Data

Data was obtained from [data.census.gov](#) for Passaic, New Jersey, using the website's built-in advanced search filters. This data comes from the 2023 5-year ACS estimates.

## CHAS City-Level Data

City-level CHAS (Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy) data for 2017-2021 was acquired using the [CHAS Query Tool](#) on the US HUD website. The data is from the "Income by Cost Burden (Renters Only)" table.



*Tenants march to demand repairs and reasonable rents, September 2024. (Make the Road New Jersey)*



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was written and researched by Amee Chew (Popular Democracy in Action). Ryan Fukumori at PolicyLink assisted with data analysis. It was reviewed by Lauren Herman, Nedia Morsy, Maggie Corser, Katie Goldstein, and Julio López Varona.

We are grateful for the thought partnership, expertise, suggestions, and assistance of Elias Bull, Tram Hoang, Maria Montesinos, Eric Seymour, and Peter Chen.

We thank our interviewees for their generous time and willingness to share their perspectives and experiences:

- Clariza
- Rosa\*
- Victor
- Edwin
- Stephanie\*
- U.A.

\* Name changed to protect anonymity.

This report is also available in Spanish—Este informe también se encuentra disponible en español. Translation into Spanish by Luis López.



**Make the Road New Jersey** builds the power of immigrant, working-class & Latinx communities to achieve dignity and respect through community organizing, high-quality legal services, policy innovation and transformative education.

<https://maketheroadnj.org/>



**Popular Democracy in Action** and its affiliates know that everyday people have the power to change the world. We upend politics as usual to forge a representative, multiracial government and society where we all thrive, no exceptions.

<https://populardemocracyinaction.org/>



# ENDNOTES

- 1 City of Passaic, ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER 231 “RENT CONTROL” TO CHAPTER 231 RENT STABILIZATION”, AMENDING SECTION 8 AND ADDING SECTION 23 RENT STABILIZATION OF 2025” OF THE CITY OF PASSAIC CODE, Pub. L. No. 2474–24 (2025), <https://www.cityofpassaic.com/DocumentCenter/View/10273/2474-24-Rent-Leveling-Board->; City of Passaic, ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER 231 “RENT STABILIZATION” OF THE CITY OF PASSAIC CODE, Pub. L. No. 2476–25 (2025), <https://www.cityofpassaic.com/DocumentCenter/View/10288/Rent-Stabilization-Ordinance-Update-2476-25-PDF>; City of Passaic. Chapter 231. Rent Stabilization (1986). <https://ecode360.com/print/PA1001?guid=8638096>.
- 2 Based on analysis of 2025 property assessment data, counting residential properties built before 1978, excluding single-family homes and owner-occupied duplexes. See Appendix for more information on methodology.
- 3 <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/passaiccitynewjersey/POP815223>; <https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B25003?q=tenure+race+and+ethnicity&g=160XX00US3456550>; Lauren Nolan, Passaic County Rental Housing Profile (New Brunswick, NJ: Ralph W. Voorhees Center for Civic Engagement, Sept. 2024), 11, 15, <https://rwv.rutgers.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Passaic-County-Rental-Housing-Profile-FINAL.pdf>.
- 4 Based on Census data for median “contract rent,” which is the agreed on monthly rent not including utilities or other payments. <https://censusreporter.org/topics/housing/>; [https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+\(Dollars\)&g=160XX00US3456550](https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+(Dollars)&g=160XX00US3456550); [https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2022.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+\(Dollars\)&g=160XX00US3456550](https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2022.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+(Dollars)&g=160XX00US3456550); [https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2021.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+\(Dollars\)&g=160XX00US3456550](https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2021.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+(Dollars)&g=160XX00US3456550).
- 5 Based on taking the difference between a 6 percent versus 3 percent annual rent increase, applied to the median monthly rent (\$1,230 in 2023 for the City of Passaic according to 1-year ACS data), in order to calculate annual savings per household. We then multiplied by estimated number of stabilized households, to calculate aggregate annual savings. For savings to low-income households, we multiplied aggregate savings to tenants by 80 percent, the proportion of renters households in the City of Passaic who are low-income, according to CHAS data for 2017–2021. See Appendix for more information on methodology.
- 6 E.g., Jonathan Fisher et al., “Estimating the Marginal Propensity to Consume Using the Distributions of Income, Consumption, and Wealth” (Washington Center for Equitable Growth, April 19, 2018), <https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/marginal-propensity-consume/>.
- 7 According to CHAS (Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy) data, in 2021, 4,020 renter households in the City of Passaic were both extremely low-income and severely rent-burdened, spending the majority of their income on housing. See Appendix for more information on methodology.
- 8 According to city-level CHAS (Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy) data for 2017–2021.
- 9 Unique Eviction Filings by Vicinage, 2021–2025 (Calendar Year), N.J. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs., Off. of Eviction Prevention (Apr. 24, 2025) (on file with authors).
- 10 See notes 19–21.
- 11 Eric Seymour, et al., “Rent Control in New Jersey: What Is It? Where Is It? How Does It Work?” Ralph W. Voorhees Center for Civic Engagement & Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, Rutgers University, 2024, p. 17, <https://rwv.rutgers.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Rent-Control-in-NJ-2024-FINAL-.pdf>
- 12 According to Census place data, in 2023, 54 percent of renter households in the City of Passaic were rent-burdened, spending 30 percent or more of their income on rent. See Appendix for more info on methodology.
- 13 E.g., see <https://www.npr.org/2023/06/21/1183408490/evictions-are-increasing-dramatically-since-the-lifting-of-pandemic-era-protecti>; <https://apnews.com/article/evictions-homelessness-affordable-housing-landlords-rental-assistance-dc4a03864011334538f82d2f404d2afb>; <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/07/us/evictions-crisis-us.html>.
- 14 E.g., Amee Chew, Chuck Collins, and Omar Ocampo. “Billionaire Blowback On Housing: How Concentrated Wealth Disrupts Housing Markets and Worsens the Housing Affordability Crisis.” Institute for Policy Studies; Popular Democracy, October 2024. <https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/billionaire-housing-disruption-report.pdf>.
- 15 Alex Horowitz, Chase Hatchett, and Adam Staveski, “How Housing Costs Drive Levels of Homelessness,” Pew, August 22, 2023, <https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2023/08/22/how-housing-costs-drive-levels-of-homelessness>; Gregg Colburn and Clayton Page Aldern, Homelessness Is a Housing Problem: How Structural Factors Explain U.S. Patterns, University of California Press, 2022.
- 16 See notes 79 and 81.
- 17 On corporate landlords’ rent hikes and role in price appreciation, see: e.g., Heather Vogell, “When Private Equity Becomes Your Landlord,” ProPublica, February 7, 2022, <https://www.propublica.org/article/when-private-equity-becomes-your-landlord>; ACCE, AFR, and Public Advocates, “Wall Street Landlords Turn Ameri-

- can Dream into a Nightmare,” January 17, 2018, <https://assets.nationbuilder.com/acceinstitute/pages/1153/attachments/original/1570049936/WallstreetLandlordsFinalReport.pdf>; ACCE Institute, “Financialization of Single-Family Rentals: The Rise of Wall Street’s New Rental Empire,” KCET, October 4, 2017, <https://www.pbssoical.org/shows/city-rising/financialization-of-single-family-rentals-the-rise-of-wall-streets-new-rental-empire>; Elora Raymond et al., “Corporate Landlords, Institutional Investors, and Displacement: Eviction Rates in Single-Family Rentals,” Community & Economic Development Discussion Paper (Atlanta: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, December 2016), [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2893552](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2893552); Joel Montano, “Piercing the Corporate Veil of LLC Landlordism: A Predatory Landlord’s Eviction Machine of Black and Brown Bodies in Los Angeles’ Working Class Neighborhoods, 1996-2019” (M.A., Urban and Regional Planning, Los Angeles, University of California, Los Angeles, 2020), <https://ucla.app.box.com/s/8gsq0kpvj3h53kz31kr2a5lxh1k6eam6>; Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, “The Next Sub-Prime Loan Crisis: How Predatory Equity Investment Is Undermining New York’s Affordable Multi-Family Rental Housing” (New York: Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, July 1, 2011), <https://anhd.org/report/next-sub-prime-loan-crisis-how-predatory-equity-investment-undermining-new-york%E2%80%99s-affordable>; Desiree Justina Fields, “From Property Abandonment to Predatory Equity: Writings on Financialization and Urban Space in New York City” (Ph.D., United States -- New York, City University of New York, 2013), <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1366760619/abstract/DAA2D9BDF155490CPQ/1>.
- 18 Troutt, David D., and Katharine Nelson. “Who Owns Newark? Transferring Wealth from Newark Homeowners to Corporate Buyers.” Rutgers Center on Law, Inequality and Metropolitan Equity, May 2022. <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b996f553917ee5e584ba742/t/626fd98bb8357d201cb8dcb5/1651497359130/Who+Owns+Newark+Final+1.pdf>.
- 19 Seymour, Eric, William Payne, Kathe Newman, and Lauren Nolan. “Corporate Ownership of Small Residential Properties in Seven New Jersey Municipalities.” Rutgers Ralph W. Voorhees Center for Civic Engagement, 2024, p. iii. [https://progressandpovertyinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/RSF2024\\_09\\_11-compressed\\_1.pdf](https://progressandpovertyinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/RSF2024_09_11-compressed_1.pdf).
- 20 Based on analysis of Passaic County property assessment records. See note 54.
- 21 Henry Gomory, “The Social and Institutional Contexts Underlying Landlords’ Eviction Practices,” Social Forces 100, no. 4 (June 1, 2022): 1774–1805, <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soab063>; Raymond et al., “Corporate Landlords, Institutional Investors, and Displacement: Eviction Rates in Single-Family Rentals,” Community & Economic Development Discussion Paper (Atlanta: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, December 2016), [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2893552](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2893552).
- 22 Unique Eviction Filings by Vicinage, 2021-2025 (Calendar Year), N.J. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs., Off. of Eviction Prevention (Apr. 24, 2025) (on file with authors).
- 23 Ameer Chew and Sarah Treuhaft, “Our Homes, Our Future: How Rent Control Can Build Stable, Healthy Communities,” (PolicyLink; Center for Popular Democracy; The Right to the City Alliance, 2019).
- 24 Panico, Rebecca. “Newark Giving Low-Income Residents Struggling Due to Coronavirus up to \$1K to Pay Rent.” NJ.com, May 14, 2020, <https://www.nj.com/essex/2020/05/newark-giving-low-income-residents-up-to-1k-to-pay-their-rent-as-coronavirus-cripples-economy.html>.
- 25 Newark limits rent increases in multi- and single-family homes to 4 percent or CPI, whichever is lower. In 2023, its City Council attempted to limit rent increases in apartments built within the last 30 years to 5 percent, challenging New Jersey’s state-level pre-emption against covering these newer buildings; but later, Newark amended this to banning undefined “unconscionable” rent increases without a fixed percentage definition. Steve Strunsky, “As the Market Heats up, Newark Tries to Keep Rents under Control.” NJ.com, August 9, 2023, <https://www.nj.com/essex/2023/08/as-the-market-heats-up-newark-tries-to-keep-rents-under-control.html>; Linda Moss, “New Jersey’s Biggest City Drops 5% Rent-Increase Cap for New Multifamily Housing,” CoStar, December 15, 2023, <https://www.costar.com/article/883559202/new-jerseys-biggest-city-drops-5-rent-increase-cap-for-new-multifamily-housing>; Eric Seymour, et al., “Rent Control in New Jersey: What Is It? Where Is It? How Does It Work?” Ralph W. Voorhees Center for Civic Engagement & Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, Rutgers University, 2024, p. 13, <https://rwv.rutgers.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Rent-Control-in-NJ-2024-FINAL-.pdf>.
- 26 Camille Furst, “Rents Can’t Go up More than 3% in This N.J. City as Council Adopts New Rent Control Rules,” NJ.com, October 20, 2022, <https://www.nj.com/news/2022/10/rents-cant-go-up-more-than-3-in-this-nj-city-as-council-adopts-new-rent-control-rules.html>.
- 27 Montgomery County, “Rent Stabilization,” Department of Housing and Community Affairs, March 21, 2025. <https://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/dhca/Tenants/RentStabilization.html>; Scott Bruton, “Rent Stabilization Regulation Overview,” Department of Housing and Community Affairs, Montgomery County, 2024, <https://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/DHCA/Resources/Files/Rent%20Stabilization/RS%20Overview%20for%20Landlords%20pdf.pdf>; <https://rentguidelines-board.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Housing-Stability-and-Tenant-Protection-Act-of-2019.pdf>; <https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/rent-guidelines/vacancy-leases/>; <https://thetownsmen.org/rent-control-in-portland-today/>; <https://pineandroses.org/podcast/demystifying-rent-control-portlands-tenant-protections/>; <https://www.axios.com/local/seattle/2025/05/07/washington-rent-hike-limit>.
- 28 <https://data.census.gov/table/ACSST1Y2023.S1901?q=passaic+city+nj+median+household+income>
- 29 <https://data.census.gov/table/ACSST1Y2023.S1901?q=clifton+nj+median+household+income>
- 30 <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/waynetownshippassaiccountynewjersey/PST045224>
- 31 Harbani Ahuja et al., Two New Jerseys: One State of Inequity (Newark: New Jersey Institute for Social Justice, 2024), 3, <https://njsj.org/print/stateofinequity.pdf>.
- 32 Ahuja et al., Two New Jerseys, 3.
- 33 Passaic is one of the most renter zip codes in the state, based on a comparison of 2023 1-year ACS data for all New Jersey zip codes: [https://data.census.gov/table/ACSST1Y2023.B25003?q=Owner/Renter+\(Tenure\)&g=160XX00US3456550](https://data.census.gov/table/ACSST1Y2023.B25003?q=Owner/Renter+(Tenure)&g=160XX00US3456550); <https://data.census.gov/table?q=DP04:+Selected+Housing+Characteris->



tics&g=040XX00US34\$8600000.

- 34 2023 1-year American Community Survey, <https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B25011?q=renter+households&g=160XX00US3456550>.
- 35 <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/passaiccitynewjersey/POP815223>; <https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B250031?q=tenure+race+and+ethnicity&g=160XX00US3456550>.
- 36 In 2021, the Area Median Income was \$113,200; extremely low-income households had annual incomes of up to 30 percent of AMI or \$33,960. Lauren Nolan, Passaic County Rental Housing Profile (New Brunswick, NJ: Ralph W. Voorhees Center for Civic Engagement, Sept. 2024), 11, 15, <https://rwv.rutgers.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Passaic-County-Rental-Housing-Profile-FINAL.pdf>.
- 37 Where “extremely low-income” means household income is less than or equal to 30 percent of the HUD Area Median Family Income, which was \$109,400 for a household of four in 2021. HUD’s CHAS data is based on the 2021 5-year ACS estimates. [https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il/il2025/2025summary.odn?STATES=34.0&INPUTNAME=METRO35620MM0875\\*3403199999%2BPassaic+County&statelst=&stname=New+Jersey&wherefrom=&statefp=34&year=2025&ne\\_flag=&selection\\_type=county&incpath=&data=2025&SubmitButton=View+County+Calculations](https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il/il2025/2025summary.odn?STATES=34.0&INPUTNAME=METRO35620MM0875*3403199999%2BPassaic+County&statelst=&stname=New+Jersey&wherefrom=&statefp=34&year=2025&ne_flag=&selection_type=county&incpath=&data=2025&SubmitButton=View+County+Calculations); [https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/home-datasets/files/HTF\\_IncomeLmts\\_State\\_NJ\\_2021.pdf](https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/home-datasets/files/HTF_IncomeLmts_State_NJ_2021.pdf).
- 38 Spreadsheet provided by the Office of Eviction Prevention in the NJ Department of Community Affairs.
- 39 Unique Eviction Filings by Vicinage, 2021-2025 (Calendar Year), N.J. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs., Off. of Eviction Prevention (Apr. 24, 2025) (on file with authors).
- 40 According to Census data on “median contract rent.” [https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+\(Dollars\)&g=160XX00US3456550](https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+(Dollars)&g=160XX00US3456550); [https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2022.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+\(Dollars\)&g=160XX00US3456550](https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2022.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+(Dollars)&g=160XX00US3456550); [https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2021.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+\(Dollars\)&g=160XX00US3456550](https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2021.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+(Dollars)&g=160XX00US3456550).
- 41 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, ENU3403140010, <https://data.bls.gov/PDQWeb/en>.
- 42 6.6 percent from 2021 to 2022 and another 7.6 percent from 2022 to 2023. [https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2022.B25057?q=B25057:+Lower+Contract+Rent+Quartile+\(Dollars\)](https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2022.B25057?q=B25057:+Lower+Contract+Rent+Quartile+(Dollars)); 2023: [https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B25057?q=B25057:+Lower+Contract+Rent+Quartile+\(Dollars\)](https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B25057?q=B25057:+Lower+Contract+Rent+Quartile+(Dollars)); 2021: [https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2021.B25057?q=B25057:+Lower+Contract+Rent+Quartile+\(Dollars\)](https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2021.B25057?q=B25057:+Lower+Contract+Rent+Quartile+(Dollars));
- 43 [https://nationalequityatlas.org/indicators/Income\\_growth?geo=04000000000034031&year=2000-2022](https://nationalequityatlas.org/indicators/Income_growth?geo=04000000000034031&year=2000-2022).
- 44 [https://www.nj.gov/dca/dlps/pdf/FourthRoundCalculation\\_Methodology.pdf](https://www.nj.gov/dca/dlps/pdf/FourthRoundCalculation_Methodology.pdf) at 37; see 4-5.
- 45 [https://www.nj.gov/dca/dlps/pdf/FourthRoundCalculation\\_Methodology.pdf](https://www.nj.gov/dca/dlps/pdf/FourthRoundCalculation_Methodology.pdf) at 4
- 46 <https://rwv.rutgers.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Passaic-County-Rental-Housing-Profile-FINAL.pdf> at 5.
- 47 Sylvan Fox, *Passaic Has Third Night of Violence*, NY Times, August 6, 1969, <https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/08/06/issue.html>; *Passaic Sets Curfew After Disorders*, Evening News.
- 48 Kenneth K. Baar, *Rent Control in the 1970s: The Case of the New Jersey Tenants’ Movement*, 28 Hastings Law Journal 631, at 644 (1977).
- 49 Baar, “Rent Control in the 1970s” at 631; *Gardens v. City of Passaic*, 130 Super. 369 (1974).
- 50 Dennis Keating and Mitch Kahn, “Rent Control in the New Millennium,” *Shelterforce* (blog), May 1, 2001, <https://shelterforce.org/2001/05/01/rent-control-in-the-new-millennium/>; Steven Wishnia, “New Jersey, Next Victim? Landlords, Politicians Take Aim at Local Rent Controls,” 1998, <http://tenant.net/tengroup/Metcounc/Sep98/nj.html>; <https://ecode360.com/print/PA1001?guid=8638096>.
- 51 Matt Fagan, “City of Passaic addresses rising rental costs. See what stabilization ordinance would do,” NorthJersey.com (Jan. 3, 2025), <https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/passaic/passaic-city/2025/01/03/city-of-passaic-reveals-plan-to-stabilize-rental-costs/77317579007/>.
- 52 Passaic, N.J. Code § 231-2, <https://ecode360.com/8638096#8638103>.
- 53 Seymour et al. “Corporate Ownership of Small Residential Properties in Seven New Jersey Municipalities.” Rutgers Ralph W. Voorhees Center for Civic Engagement, 2024, p. iii, 34. [https://progressandpovertyinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/RSF2024\\_09\\_11-compressed\\_1.pdf](https://progressandpovertyinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/RSF2024_09_11-compressed_1.pdf).
- 54 Based on analysis of Passaic County property assessment records for class 2, 4A, and 4C buildings. Unit counts are incomplete due to missing source data. See Appendix for more information on methodology.
- 55 Ibid. “Apartment buildings” refers to class 4C properties of five or more units.
- 56 Kathryn Sabbeth. “Eviction Courts.” *Univ. of St. Thomas Law Journal*, 18, no. 2 (2022): 377-78, 402-03. Henry Gomory, Douglas S. Massey, James R. Hendrickson & Matthew Desmond. “The Racially Disparate Influence of Filing Fees on Eviction Rates.” *Housing Policy Debate* 33, no. 6 (2023): 1463-1483. doi: 10.1080/10511482.2023.2212662.
- 57 Information provided by Make the Road New Jersey community members and clients.
- 58 Matt Fagan, Passaic OKs accessory dwelling units to add to its affordable housing stock, NorthJersey.com (April 1, 2024), <https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/passaic/passaic-city/2024/04/01/passaic-oks-resolutions-that-will-add-to-its-affordable-housing-stock/73030315007/>; see Passaic, N.J. Code § 317-30, <https://ecode360.com/8711002#8711002>.
- 59 Matt Fagan, Passaic OKs accessory dwelling units to add to its affordable housing stock, NorthJersey.com (April 1, 2024), <https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/passaic/passaic-city/2024/04/01/passaic-oks-resolutions-that-will-add-to-its-affordable-housing-stock/73030315007/>; see Passaic, N.J. Code § 317-

16(G), <https://ecode360.com/8710699#8710708>.

60 Regional Plan Association. “Be my Neighbor: Untapped Housing Solutions: ADUs and Conversions” (2020), <https://rpa.org/work/reports/be-my-neighbor>.

61 *Passaic OKs accessory dwelling units to add to its affordable housing stock*, *supra*, and <https://www.cityofpassaic.com/DocumentCenter/View/10353/ADU-Funding-2025-PDF>.

62 See ordinances - rents not to exceed HUD maximum income limits.

63 Matt Fagan, *Passaic tenants march against property owner, rent hikes. Want a return to rent control*, *NorthJersey.com* (Sept. 19, 2024), <https://www.aol.com/passaic-tenants-march-against-property-212427801.html>; Matt Fagan, *City of Passaic addresses rising rental costs. See what stabilization ordinance would do*, *NorthJersey.com* (Jan. 3, 2025), <https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/passaic/passaic-city/2025/01/03/city-of-passaic-reveals-plan-to-stabilize-rental-costs/77317579007/>; Passaic, N.J. Code § 231-23, <https://ecode360.com/8638096>.

64 Matt Fagan, *City of Passaic addresses rising rental costs. See what stabilization ordinance would do*, *NorthJersey.com* (Jan. 3, 2025), <https://www.yahoo.com/news/city-passaic-addresses-rising-rental-091020734.html>.

65 City of Passaic, ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER 231 “RENT CONTROL” TO CHAPTER 231 RENT STABILIZATION”, AMENDING SECTION 8 AND ADDING SECTION 23 RENT STABILIZATION OF 2025” OF THE CITY OF PASSAIC CODE, Pub. L. No. 2474–24 (2025), <https://www.cityofpassaic.com/DocumentCenter/View/10273/2474-24-Rent-Leveling-Board->; City of Passaic, ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER 231 “RENT STABILIZATION” OF THE CITY OF PASSAIC CODE, Pub. L. No. 2476–25 (2025), <https://www.cityofpassaic.com/DocumentCenter/View/10288/Rent-Stabilization-Ordinance-Update-2476-25-PDF>.

66 See ordinances or Passaic, N.J. Code § 231-23(D), <https://ecode360.com/8638096#46045166>.

67 Based on analysis of 2025 property assessment data, counting residential properties built before 1978, excluding single-family homes and owner-occupied duplexes. See Appendix for more information on methodology.

68 2023 1-year American Community Survey, <https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B25011?q=renter+households&g=160XX00US3456550>.

69 Based on analysis of 2025 assessor data, counting residential properties built after 1978, excluding single-family homes and owner-occupied duplexes. See Appendix for more information on methodology.

70 See note 3.

71 [https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+\(Dollars\)&g=160XX00US3456550](https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+(Dollars)&g=160XX00US3456550); [https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2022.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+\(Dollars\)&g=160XX00US3456550](https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2022.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+(Dollars)&g=160XX00US3456550); [https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2021.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+\(Dollars\)&g=160XX00US3456550](https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2021.B25058?q=B25058:+Median+Contract+Rent+(Dollars)&g=160XX00US3456550).

72 According to Census place data, in 2023, 54 percent of renter households in the City of Passaic were rent-burdened, spending 30 percent or more of their income on rent. See Appendix for more info on methodology.

73 Based on taking the difference between a 6 percent versus 3 percent annual rent increase, applied to the median monthly rent (\$1,230 in 2023 for the City of Passaic according to 1-year ACS data), in order to calculate annual savings per household. We then multiplied by estimated number of stabilized households, to calculate aggregate annual savings. For savings to low-income households, we multiplied aggregate savings to tenants by 80 percent, the proportion of renters households in the City of Passaic who are low-income, according to CHAS data for 2017-2021. See Appendix for more information on methodology.

74 According to CHAS (Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy) data, in 2021, 4,020 renter households in the City of Passaic were both extremely low-income and severely cost-burdened, spending the majority of their income on housing. See Appendix for more information on methodology.

75 According to city-level CHAS (Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy) data for 2017-2021.

76 Unique Eviction Filings by Vicinage, 2021-2025 (Calendar Year), N.J. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs., Off. of Eviction Prevention (Apr. 24, 2025) (on file with authors).

77 See also note 21. Our analysis of available court docket records for Passaic County landlord-tenant cases filed between January to early May 2025, obtained from the New Jersey Courts. Eviction records are not easily accessible or obtainable, and those available were a fraction of eviction filings.

78 Ameer Chew and Sarah Treuhaft. “Our Homes, Our Future: How Rent Control Can Build Stable, Healthy Communities.” PolicyLink; Center for Popular Democracy; The Right to the City Alliance, 2019. [https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/OurHomesOurFuture\\_Web\\_08-02-19.pdf](https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/OurHomesOurFuture_Web_08-02-19.pdf).

79 Whitney Airgood-Obrycki, Alexander Hermann, and Sophia Wedeen, “Deteriorating Rental Affordability: An Update on America’s Rental Housing 2024,” Research Brief. Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies, December 2024, p. 9, [https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/research/files/harvard\\_jchs\\_rental\\_affordability\\_airgood-obrycki\\_2024.pdf](https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/research/files/harvard_jchs_rental_affordability_airgood-obrycki_2024.pdf); Wedeen, “Low-Cost Rentals Have Decreased in Every State | Joint Center for Housing Studies,” Housing Perspectives, July 6, 2023, <https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/low-cost-rentals-have-decreased-every-state>.

80 Joint Center for Housing Studies, “America’s Rental Housing 2024,” Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2024, p. 2, 18, [https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard\\_JCHS\\_Americas\\_Rental\\_Housing\\_2024.pdf](https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_Americas_Rental_Housing_2024.pdf).

81 Claudiu Tiganescu, “Affordable Housing Market Report - February 2025,” Yardi Matrix Blog (blog), February 6, 2025, <https://www.yardimatrix.com/blog/affordable-housing-market-report-february-2025/>.

82 HITstrategies, “Key Findings Memo on Housing Poll,” (HITstrategies; Center for Popular Democracy; Right to the City Action), June 2024, p. 2, [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1czMazr4XwEliY-BjoHzSKRVE91UkQk5V/view?usp=embed\\_facebook](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1czMazr4XwEliY-BjoHzSKRVE91UkQk5V/view?usp=embed_facebook); Popular Democracy and Right to the City Action, “Swing State Housing Poll Deck,” 2024, <https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Housing%20Poll%20Deck.pdf>; Data for Progress, “Data for Progress: Battleground Issues Cross-



tabs," Data for Progress, August 2024, <https://www.filesforprogress.org/datasets/2024/8/dfp-battleground-issues-crosstabs.pdf>; Dana Anderson, "Roughly 4 in 5 U.S. Residents Believe There Should Be Caps on Rent Hikes: Survey," Redfin Real Estate News, October 24, 2024, <https://www.redfin.com/news/survey-home-owners-renters-support-rent-hikes/>; Lake Research Partners, "Findings from a Nationwide Survey on Housing and Renter Protections," (Lake Research Partners; HouseUS), July 11, 2023, p. 1, 3, 8-9, 10, [https://houseus.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/HouseUS\\_July2023\\_Research\\_Report.pdf](https://houseus.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/HouseUS_July2023_Research_Report.pdf); Washington Low Income Housing Alliance, "New Poll Finds Supermajority of Registered Voters Support Policy to Stop Rent Gouging," Washington Low Income Housing Alliance, February 11, 2025, <https://www.wliha.org/blog/new-poll-finds-supermajority-registered-voters-support-policy-stop-rent-gouging>; EMC Research, "Washington Rent Stabilization Survey," EMC Research, February 10, 2025, <https://www.wliha.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/WA%20Statewide%20Rent%20Survey%20Memo%5B7%5D.pdf>; Samuel Stein, Oksana Mironova, and Iziah Thompson, "Across the State, New Yorkers Support Rent Stabilization and Good Cause," Community Service Society, February 2025, [https://smhttp-ssl-58547.nexcesscdn.net/nycss/images/uploads/pubs/021325\\_AnnualSurvey2024\\_GoodCause-RentStabilization\\_V7.pdf](https://smhttp-ssl-58547.nexcesscdn.net/nycss/images/uploads/pubs/021325_AnnualSurvey2024_GoodCause-RentStabilization_V7.pdf); Austin C. Jefferson, "New Survey Finds Almost Everyone Supports Rent Stabilization," City & State New York, February 26, 2025, <https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2025/02/new-survey-finds-almost-everyone-supports-rent-stabilization/403301/>; Mathilde Lind Gustavussen, "Battleground State Voters Want Rent Control and Social Housing," Jacobin, August 16, 2024, <https://jacobin.com/2024/08/rent-control-social-housing-harris>; Jake Johnson, "Analysis Shows Embracing Bold Renter Protections Can Help Democrats Win in 2024," June 18, 2024, <https://www.commondreams.org/news/tenant-rights-democrats>.

83 Analysis by Popular Democracy in Action.

84 E.g., Stephen Barton, "The Economics of Residential Rent Control," Dollars & Sense, February 2019, [https://rentboard.berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Other\\_2019\\_Barton\\_The%20Economics%20of%20Residential%20Rent%20Control.pdf](https://rentboard.berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Other_2019_Barton_The%20Economics%20of%20Residential%20Rent%20Control.pdf). See also: Gary Painter, "No, Rent Control Doesn't Always Reduce the Supply of Housing," LaTimes.com, October 31, 2018, <http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-painter-rent-control-economist-20181031-story.html>; Richard Arnott, "Time for Revisionism on Rent Control?," The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Nashville 9, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 99, <https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf-plus/10.1257/jep.9.1.99>; Tom Slater, "From Displacements to Rent Control and Housing Justice," Urban Geography 42, no. 5 (May 28, 2021), p. 705-6, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2021.1958473>; Mark Paul, James K. Galbraith, Isabella Weber, Janelle Jones, and J. W. Mason, "Re: Tenant Protections for Enterprise-Backed Multifamily Properties Request for Input," July 28, 2023, [https://peoplesaction.org/wp-content/uploads/Economist-Sign-on-Letter\\_-FHFA-RFI-Response-1.pdf](https://peoplesaction.org/wp-content/uploads/Economist-Sign-on-Letter_-FHFA-RFI-Response-1.pdf).

85 Ameer Chew, Chuck Collins, and Omar Ocampo, "Billionaire Blowback On Housing: How Concentrated Wealth Disrupts Housing Markets and Worsens the Housing Affordability Crisis," Institute for Policy Studies; Popular Democracy, October 2024, <https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/billionaire-housing-disruption-report.pdf>.

86 Will Parker, "Aiming at Wealthy Renters, Developers Build More Luxury Apartments Than They Have in Decades," Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2020, sec. Real Estate, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/aiming-at-wealthy-renters-developers-build-more-luxury-apartments-than-they-have-in-decades-11579084202>; Chew and Treuhaft, "Our Homes, Our Future: How Rent Control Can Build Stable, Healthy Communities," p. 14, [https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/OurHome-sOurFuture\\_Web\\_08-02-19.pdf](https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/OurHome-sOurFuture_Web_08-02-19.pdf); Andrew Aurand, Dan Emmanuel, and Daniel Threet, "The Gap: A Shortage of Affordable Homes, 2021" (Washington, D.C.: National Low Income Housing Coalition, 2021), 17, [https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report\\_2021.pdf](https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2021.pdf); Miriam Zuk and Karen Chapple, "Housing Production, Filtering and Displacement: Untangling the Relationships," Research Brief (Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley, May 2016), p. 3-4 <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7bx938fx>; Stuart S. Rosenthal, "Are Private Markets and Filtering a Viable Source of Low-Income Housing? Estimates from a 'Repeat Income' Model," The American Economic Review 104, no. 2 (2014): 704.

87 Kathe Newman and Elvin K. Wyly, "The Right to Stay Put, Revisited: Gentrification and Resistance to Displacement in New York City," Urban Studies 43, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 23-57, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980500388710>; W. A. V. Clark and Allan D. Heskin, "The Impact of Rent Control on Tenure Discounts and Residential Mobility," Land Economics 58, no. 1 (1982): 109-17 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3146080>; Peter Linneman, "The Effect of Rent Control on the Distribution of Income among New York City Renters," Journal of Urban Economics 22, no. 1 (July 1, 1987): 14-34; Joseph Gyourko and Peter Linneman, "Equity and Efficiency Aspects of Rent Control: An Empirical Study of New York City," Journal of Urban Economics 26, no. 1 (July 1, 1989): 54-74; Ned Levine, J. Eugene Grigsby, and Allan Heskin, "Who Benefits from Rent Control? Effects on Tenants in Santa Monica, California," Journal of the American Planning Association 56, no. 2 (1990): 140, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01944369008975755>; Richard W. Ault, John D. Jackson, and Richard P. Saba, "The Effect of Long-Term Rent Control on Tenant Mobility," Journal of Urban Economics 35, no. 2 (March 1, 1994): 140-58; John Nagy, "Increased Duration and Sample Attrition in New York City's Rent Controlled Sector," Journal of Urban Economics 38, no. 2 (September 1, 1995): 127-37; Jakob Roland Munch and Michael Svarer, "Rent Control and Tenancy Duration," Journal of Urban Economics 52, no. 3 (November 1, 2002): 542-60; Jay Kelekian et al., "Rent Stabilization and the Berkeley Rental Housing Market 15 Years after Vacancy Decontrol" (Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board, January 28, 2013); NYU Furman Center, "Profile of Rent-Stabilized Units and Tenants in New York City," (NYU Furman Center, June 2014), [http://furmancenter.org/files/FurmanCenter\\_FactBrief\\_RentStabilization\\_June2014.pdf](http://furmancenter.org/files/FurmanCenter_FactBrief_RentStabilization_June2014.pdf); David P. Sims, "Rent Control Rationing and Community Composition: Evidence from Massachusetts," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 11, no. 1 (2011); Gilderbloom, John I., and Lin Ye, "Thirty years of rent control: A survey of New Jersey cities," Journal of Urban Affairs 29, no. 2 (2007): 207-220; Rebecca Diamond, Timothy McQuade, and Franklin Qian, "The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco," NBER Working Paper No. 24181, (National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2018), <https://www.nber.org/papers/w24181>; Prasanna Rajasekaran, Mark Treskon, and Solomon Greene, "Rent Control: What Does the Research Tell Us about the Effectiveness of Local Action?" (Urban Institute, January 16, 2019), <https://www.urban.org/research/publica->

[tion/rent-control-what-does-research-tell-us-about-effectiveness-local-action](#); Kenneth Baar, Patrick Burns, Daniel Flaming, and Anthony W. Orlando, “Equitable Rent: Rent Stabilization Standards in the City of Los Angeles,” Los Angeles: Economic Roundtable, September 2024, p. 23-26, <https://economicrt.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Equitable-Rent-Economic-Roundtable-report-on-the-RSO-9-12-2024-compact.pdf>. On Gyourko and Linneman, as well as Diamond et al: these studies frame tenant stability as a negative outcome of rent control, even though they find that rent control increases tenant stability.

- 88 The ratio of the mobility rate after rent stabilization, in 1979-1980, to the mobility rate before rent stabilization in 1977, was 63 percent – representing a 37 percent drop. In Clark and Heskin, “The Impact of Rent Control on Tenure Discounts and Residential Mobility,” p. 112.
- 89 See note 77.
- 90 NYU Furman Center, “Profile of Rent-Stabilized Units and Tenants in New York City,” Fact Brief (NYU Furman Center, June 2014), 5
- 91 For evidence on rent control’s disproportionate benefits to low-income households, see Kathe Newman and Elvin K. Wyly, “The Right to Stay Put, Revisited: Gentrification and Resistance to Displacement in New York City,” *Urban Studies* 43, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 23–57, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980500388710>; Peter Linneman, “The Effect of Rent Control on the Distribution of Income among New York City Renters,” *Journal of Urban Economics* 22, no. 1 (July 1, 1987): 14–34; Ned Levine, J. Eugene Grigsby, and Allan Heskin, “Who Benefits from Rent Control? Effects on Tenants in Santa Monica, California,” *Journal of the American Planning Association* 56, no. 2 (1990), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01944369008975755>; Diamond et al., “The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco,” NBER Working Paper No. 24181, (National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2018), <https://www.nber.org/papers/w24181>; Laura Gil-Trejo, Rachel Peterson, Frederick Rose, and Eduardo Castillo, “Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board Survey of Tenants of Registered Rental Units: 2022 Report,” City of Berkeley; Social Science Research Center, CalState Fullerton, 2023, <https://rentboard.berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022%20Tenant%20Survey%20Presentation%20and%20Results.pdf>; Patrick Burns and Daniel Flaming, “Outcomes from Rent Stabilization in San José,” Economic Roundtable, November 2019, <https://www.sanjoseca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/58855/637257392314200000>. For benefits to people of color, see: Clark and Heskin, “The Impact of Rent Control on Tenure Discounts and Residential Mobility,” 115; Kelekian et al., “Rent Stabilization and the Berkeley Rental Housing Market,” 17–18; NYU Furman Center, “Profile of Rent-Stabilized Units and Tenants in New York City,” 7; Sims, “Rent Control Rationing and Community Composition: Evidence from Massachusetts,” *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy* 11, no. 1 (2011): 11; Joshua D. Ambrosius et al., “Forty years of rent control: Reexamining New Jersey’s moderate local policies after the great recession,” *Cities* 49 (2015): 121-133; Burns and Flaming, “Outcomes from Rent Stabilization in San José.” For benefits to seniors, see Clark and Heskin, “The Impact of Rent Control on Tenure Discounts and Residential Mobility”; Kelekian, “Report on the April - May 2009 Survey of Tenants of Registered Rental Units” (Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board, March 15, 2010), [https://rentboard.berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Survey\\_Tenant\\_2009.pdf](https://rentboard.berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Survey_Tenant_2009.pdf); Kelekian et al., “Rent Stabilization and the Berkeley Rental Housing Market”; Edward L. Glaeser, “Does Rent Control Reduce Segregation?,” *Swedish Economic Policy Review* 10 (2003): 196–97; Gyourko and Linneman, “Equity and Efficiency Aspects of Rent Control.” For benefits to persons living with disability, see Kelekian, “2009 Survey of Tenants”; Kelekian et al., “Rent Stabilization and the Berkeley Rental Housing Market.” For benefits to families with children, see Levine, Grigsby, and Heskin, “Who Benefits from Rent Control?”
- 92 In 2003, only 1 out of 15 poor renters who remained in gentrifying New York City neighborhoods rented in the unregulated market—48 percent lived in stabilized units and the rest largely lived in public housing. Newman and Wyly, “The Right to Stay Put, Revisited”; Diamond, McQuade, and Qian, “The Effects of Rent Control Expansion.”
- 93 Cost differentials are calculated based on the difference between monthly rent in stabilized versus non-stabilized units. For Los Angeles, we compare average gross rents for stabilized and non-stabilized units from 2018-2022; data also shows that for units of comparable size, the average rent paid by renters in stabilized units is 19 percent lower than that in non-stabilized units (see Kenneth Baar, Patrick Burns, Daniel Flaming, and Anthony W. Orlando, “Equitable Rent: Rent Stabilization Standards in the City of Los Angeles,” Los Angeles: Economic Roundtable, September 2024, <https://economicrt.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Equitable-Rent-Economic-Roundtable-report-on-the-RSO-9-12-2024-compact.pdf>, p. 40, 44). In San Jose, we compare average rent in stabilized and unstabilized 1-bedroom units; roughly 44 percent of the stabilized housing stock are 1-bedrooms (see City of San José Housing Department, “Rent Stabilization Program Annual Report 2020-2021: Executive Summary,” City of San José Housing Department, 2021, <https://www.sanjoseca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/79581/637723310001700000>). In Santa Monica, we compare median rent in 2023 for stabilized units rented out at market-rate that year (a proxy for unstabilized rents) with rent for stabilized units only (see Rent Control Agency, “Santa Monica Rent Control Board 2023 Annual Report.” Santa Monica, CA: Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 2024, [https://www.smgov.net/uploadedFiles/Departments/Rent\\_Control/Reports/Annual\\_Reports/SMRCB%202023%20Annual%20Report.pdf](https://www.smgov.net/uploadedFiles/Departments/Rent_Control/Reports/Annual_Reports/SMRCB%202023%20Annual%20Report.pdf), p. 23). In New York City, we compare median contract rent in 2023 for stabilized versus market units (see E. Gaumer, “2023 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey: Selected Initial Findings,” New York: New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development, 2024, <https://www.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/about/2023-nychvs-selected-initial-findings.pdf>, p. 14). In Manhattan, we compare median gross rent in 2017 in stabilized versus unregulated units (see C.R. Waickman, J.B.R. Jerome, and R. Place. “Affordability of Rent Stabilized Units.” Rent Regulation Memo #2. New York City Department of Housing Preservation & Development, 2018. <https://www.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/services/rent-regulation-memo-2.pdf>, p. 3).
- 94 Autor, Palmer, and Pathak, “Housing Market Spillovers” p. 662; Timothy L. Collins, “Rent Regulation in New York: Myths and Facts,” 2009, p. 17, <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Lo6qeKjEqZ03RUo9tSLyUvABsScrn9Mz/view?usp=sharing>.
- 95 By 2009, unregulated rents were an average of 52 percent higher than regulated rents. Lance Freeman and Frank Braconi, “Gentrification and Displacement: New



- York City in the 1990s,” *Journal of the American Planning Association* 70, no. 1 (March 31, 2004): 51; Timothy L. Collins, “Rent Regulation in New York: Myths and Facts,” 2009, p. 17, <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Lo6qeKjEqZ03RUo9tSLyUvABsScrn9Mz/view?usp=sharing>.
- 96 E.g., Lauren E. M. Everett, “Fortunate People in a Fortunate Land: Dwelling and Residential Alienation in Santa Monica’s Rent-Controlled Housing,” Ph.D. in Urban Studies, Portland State University, 2022, p. 263, 268, <https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.7864>; Chew and Treuhaft, “Our Homes, Our Future: How Rent Control Can Build Stable, Healthy Communities,” (PolicyLink; Center for Popular Democracy; The Right to the City Alliance, 2019), [https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/OurHomesOurFuture\\_Web\\_08-02-19.pdf](https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/OurHomesOurFuture_Web_08-02-19.pdf).
- 97 E.g., Chew and Treuhaft, “Our Homes, Our Future: How Rent Control Can Build Stable, Healthy Communities,” p. 3, 10, [https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/OurHomesOurFuture\\_Web\\_08-02-19.pdf](https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/OurHomesOurFuture_Web_08-02-19.pdf).
- 98 E.g., Heskin, Levine, and Garrett, “The Effects of Vacancy Control;” John Ingram Gilderbloom, and Lin Ye. “Pros and Cons of Rent Control.” In *Invisible City: Poverty, Housing, and New Urbanism*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008, p. 90; Rent Control Agency, “Santa Monica Rent Control Board 2017 Annual Report,” 21; Kelekian, “2009 Survey of Tenants,” 17–18; Kenneth Baar, Patrick Burns, Daniel Flaming, and Anthony W. Orlando, “Equitable Rent: Rent Stabilization Standards in the City of Los Angeles,” Los Angeles: Economic Roundtable, September 2024, p. 93, <https://economicrt.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Equitable-Rent-Economic-Roundtable-report-on-the-RSO-9-12-2024-compact.pdf>; Rent Control Agency, “Santa Monica Rent Control Board 2024 Annual Report,” Santa Monica, CA: Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 2025, p. 10, 18, <https://www.santamonica.gov/media/Document%20Library/Topic%20Explainers/Rent%20Control%20Information%20by%20Subject/SMRCB%202024%20Annual%20Report.pdf>; Rent Stabilization and Housing Division, “Rent Stabilization Program Annual Report 2017–2018,” City of West Hollywood Rent Stabilization and Housing Division, 2018, p. 7, <https://www.weho.org/home/showpublisheddocument/41186/637018038832870000>; City of San José Housing Department, “Rent Stabilization Program: Updated Draft Strategic Plan 2023–2026,” City of San José Housing Department, September 2023, p. 11, <https://www.sanjoseca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/105133/638318580900100000>.
- 99 John Ingram Gilderbloom, and Lin Ye. “Pros and Cons of Rent Control.” In *Invisible City: Poverty, Housing, and New Urbanism*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008, p. 90. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/socal/detail.action?docID=3443272>.
- 100 Rent Control Agency, “Santa Monica Rent Control Board 2017 Annual Report,” 21.
- 101 Heskin, Levine, and Garrett, “The Effects of Vacancy Control,” 166; Kelekian, “2009 Survey of Tenants,” 17–18.
- 102 E.g., Ricardo Tranjan and Paulina Vargatho, “Rent Control in Ontario: The Facts, the Flaws, the Fixes,” Ontario: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, September 2024, p. 4, 11, 20, <https://policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/Ontario%20Office/2024/04/rent-control-in-ontario.pdf>.
- 103 John Ingram Gilderbloom, and Lin Ye, “Pros and Cons of Rent Control,” In *Invisible City: Poverty, Housing, and New Urbanism*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008, p. 77, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/socal/detail.action?docID=3443272>; John I. Gilderbloom & Lin Ye, *Thirty Years of Rent Control: A Study of New Jersey Cities*, 29 *J. Urb. Affs.* 207, 209 (2007).
- 104 Edward G. Goetz, Anthony Damiano, Peter Hendee Brown, Patrick Alcorn, and Jeff Matson, “Minneapolis Rent Stabilization Study,” Minneapolis, MN: Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, 2021. p. 2, 52–3, <https://www.cura.umn.edu/sites/cura.umn.edu/files/2021-08/Minneapolis-Rent-Stabilization-Study-web.pdf>.
- 105 See note 91. In addition, on disproportionate benefits to immigrants: Gaumer, “2023 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey,” p. 50; Tom Waters and Victor Bach, “Housing the City of Immigrants: Many Immigrant Communities Are Vulnerable to Unaffordable Rents and Other Housing Stresses,” Policy Brief (Community Service Society, March 2011), <https://smhttp-ssl-58547.nexcesscdn.net/nycss/images/uploads/pubs/HousingCityofImmigrantsPolicyBriefMarch2011.pdf>. On women-headed households, see: Gyourko and Linneman, “Equity and Efficiency Aspects of Rent Control,” 59, 64; Kelekian, “2009 Survey of Tenants;” Mark Uh, “From Own To Rent: Who Lost The American Dream?,” Trulia Research, February 11, 2016, <https://www.trulia.com/research/own-to-rent/>; Burns and Flaming, “Outcomes from Rent Stabilization in San José,” Economic Roundtable, November 2019, p. 29, <https://www.sanjoseca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/58855/637257392314200000>. Note: The Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board’s survey collects data on the gender of household heads, but has not reported an analysis of this.
- 106 E.g., NYU Furman Center, “Profile of Rent-Stabilized Units and Tenants in New York City,” 4. See also Gaumer, “2023 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey: Selected Initial Findings,” New York: New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development, 2024, p. 50 <https://www.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/about/2023-nychvs-selected-initial-findings.pdf>. See note 91.
- 107 In California, particularly in rent-controlled units that were vacancy controlled. Amee Chew, “How Rent Control Promotes Racial Equity,” *Shelterforce*, April 2, 2020, <https://shelterforce.org/2020/04/02/how-rent-control-promotes-racial-equity/>; E. Gaumer, “2023 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey: Selected Initial Findings,” New York: New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development, 2024, p. 50, <https://www.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/about/2023-nychvs-selected-initial-findings.pdf>; NYU Furman Center, “Profile of Rent-Stabilized Units and Tenants in New York City”; Ambrosius, Joshua D. et al., “Forty Years of Rent Control”; Gilderbloom and Ye, “Thirty Years of Rent Control”; Sims, “Rent Control Rationing and Community Composition: Evidence from Massachusetts,” *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy* 11, no. 1 (2011): 28; Heskin, Levine, and Garrett, “The Effects of Vacancy Control”; Kelekian, “2009 Survey of Tenants,” 17–18; Gil-Trejo et al., “Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board Survey of Tenants of Registered Rental Units: 2022 Report,” City of Berkeley; Social Science Research Center, CalState Fullerton, 2023, <https://rentboard.berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022%20Tenant%20Survey%20Presenta->

- [tion%20and%20Results.pdf](#); Baar et al., “Equitable Rent: Rent Stabilization Standards in the City of Los Angeles,” Los Angeles: Economic Roundtable, September 2024, p. 23-26, <https://economicrt.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Equitable-Rent-Economic-Roundtable-report-on-the-RSO-9-12-2024-compact.pdf>; Burns and Flaming, “Outcomes from Rent Stabilization in San José,” Economic Roundtable, November 2019, <https://www.sanjoseca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/58855/637257392314200000>.
- 108 E.g., Tom Waters and Victor Bach, “Housing the City of Immigrants: Many Immigrant Communities Are Vulnerable to Unaffordable Rents and Other Housing Stressors,” Policy Brief (Community Service Society, March 2011), p. 4, <https://smhttp-ssl-58547.nexcesscdn.net/nycss/images/uploads/pubs/HousingCityofImmigrantsPolicyBriefMarch2011.pdf.pdf>.
- 109 E.g., Gaumer, “2023 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey,” p. 50.
- 110 E.g., Slater, “From Displacements to Rent Control and Housing Justice,” *Urban Geography* 42, no. 5 (May 28, 2021), p. 708, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2021.1958473>; Bradon Weiss, “Corporate Consolidation of Rental Housing & the Case for National Rent Stabilization,” *Wash. U. L. Rev.* 101, no. 553 (2023), [https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3241&context=facsch\\_lawrev](https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3241&context=facsch_lawrev); Sammi Aibinder and Lindsay Owens, “No Room for Rent: Addressing Rising Rent Prices through Public Investment and Public Power.” Issue Brief. Roosevelt Institute, November 9, 2021, <https://rooseveltinstitute.org/publications/no-room-for-rent-addressing-rising-rent-prices-through-public-investment-and-public-power/>.
- 111 Jonathan Fisher et al., “Estimating the Marginal Propensity to Consume Using the Distributions of Income, Consumption, and Wealth” (Washington Center for Equitable Growth, April 19, 2018), <https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/marginal-propensity-consume/>.
- 112 E.g., Aibinder and Owens, “No Room for Rent: Addressing Rising Rent Prices through Public Investment and Public Power.” Issue Brief. Roosevelt Institute, November 9, 2021, p. 4, <https://rooseveltinstitute.org/publications/no-room-for-rent-addressing-rising-rent-prices-through-public-investment-and-public-power/>.
- 113 Matthew Desmond and Carl Gershenson, “Housing and Employment Insecurity among the Working Poor,” *Social Problems*, no. Issue 1 (2016): 46
- 114 Small businesses that rely on lower income clientele often struggle to stay in business when neighborhoods gentrify and their customer base dwindles. E.g., Paul M. Ong, Chhandara Pech, and Rosalie Ray, “TOD Impacts on Businesses in Four Asian American Neighborhoods” (UCLA Center for the Study of Inequality, May 2014), [http://www.urbandisplacement.org/sites/default/files/images/overall\\_tod\\_final.pdf](http://www.urbandisplacement.org/sites/default/files/images/overall_tod_final.pdf); Edber Macedo et al., “Impact of Big Businesses in Chinatown” (UCLA Center for the Study of Inequality, July 2014), [http://www.urbandisplacement.org/sites/default/files/images/walmart\\_starbucks\\_final08011.pdf](http://www.urbandisplacement.org/sites/default/files/images/walmart_starbucks_final08011.pdf); Ghebreegziabher Debrezion, Eric Pels, and Piet Rietveld, “The Impact of Railway Stations on Residential and Commercial Property Value: A Meta-Analysis,” *The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics* 35, no. 2 (August 1, 2007): 161–80; Sharon Zukin et al., “New Retail Capital and Neighborhood Change: Boutiques and Gentrification in New York City,” *City & Community* 8, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 47–64.
- 115 Megan Sandel et al., “Unstable Housing and Caregiver and Child Health in Renter Families,” *Pediatrics* 141, no. 2 (February 2018): 2017–2199.
- 116 Nick Graetz et al., “The impacts of rent burden and eviction on mortality in the United States, 2000–2019,” *Social Science & Medicine*, Volume 340, (2024), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2023.116398>.
- 117 For example, L.A. County Department of Public Health, “Social Determinants of Health: Housing and Health in Los Angeles County,” *Social Determinants of Health* (L.A. County Department of Public Health, February 2015), [http://publichealth.lacounty.gov/ha/reports/LAHealthBrief2011/HousingHealth/SD\\_Housing\\_Fs.pdf](http://publichealth.lacounty.gov/ha/reports/LAHealthBrief2011/HousingHealth/SD_Housing_Fs.pdf); Sandra J. Newman and C. Scott Holupka, “Housing Affordability and Investments in Children,” *Journal of Housing Economics*, *Housing Policy in the United States*, 24, no. Supplement C (June 1, 2014): 89–100.
- 118 For example, Jeffrey Lubell et al., “Housing and Health: New Opportunities for Dialogue and Action” (National Center for Healthy Housing, 2011), [http://changelab-solutions.org/sites/default/files/Health%20%20Housing%20New%20Opportunities\\_final.pdf](http://changelab-solutions.org/sites/default/files/Health%20%20Housing%20New%20Opportunities_final.pdf); Joshua Sharfstein et al., “Is Child Health at Risk While Families Wait for Housing Vouchers?,” *American Journal of Public Health* 91, no. 8 (2001): 1191–1192; Angst et al., “How Do Renters Survive Unaffordability? Household-level impacts of rent burden in Los Angeles,” *Journal of Urban Affairs* (2023); Maguire, “The Role of Debt in the Maintenance of Homelessness,” *Frontiers in Public Health* 9 (2021); Pollack, Griffin, and Lynch, “Housing Affordability and Health among Homeowners and Renters,” *American Journal of Preventative Medicine* vol 39, 6 (2010), <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749379710004551>; Bills, West, and Hargrove, “Housing Cost Burden and Maternal Stress among Very Low Income Mothers,” *Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare* 46 (2019); Graetz et al., “The Impacts of Rent Burden and Eviction on Mortality in the United States, 2000–2019,” *Social Science & Medicine* 340 (2024); Hess et al., “Cumulative Housing Cost Burden Exposures and Disadvantages to Children’s Well-Being and Health,” *Social Science Research* 119 (2024); Kirkpatrick and Tarasuk, “Housing Circumstances Are Associated with Household Food Access among Low-Income Urban Families,” *Journal of Urban Health* 88, no. 2 (2011): 284–296; Elliott, West, and Castro, “Rent Burden and Depression Among Mothers: An analysis of primary caregiver outcomes,” *Journal of Policy Practice and Research* 2, no. 4 (2021): 285–300.
- 119 Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies, “The State of the Nation’s Housing 2013” (Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2013), 5–6, <http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/son2013.pdf>.
- 120 For example, Hugo Vásquez-Vera et al., “The Threat of Home Eviction and Its Effects on Health through the Equity Lens: A Systematic Review,” *Social Science & Medicine* 175, no. Supplement C (February 1, 2017): 199–208; Matthew Desmond and Rachel Tolbert Kimbro, “Eviction’s Fallout: Housing, Hardship, and Health,” *Social Forces* 94, no. 1 (September 2015): 295–324; Mindy Fullilove, *Root Shock: How Tearing Up City Neighborhoods Hurts America, and What We Can Do About It* (Random House Publishing Group, 2009).
- 121 A study of 12,882 New York City residents found that controlling for other factors, those displaced from gentrifying neighborhoods had higher rates of emergen-



- cy room visits, hospitalizations, and mental health-related visits, compared to their counterparts who remained—or who lived in low-income neighborhoods that were not gentrifying. Sungwoo Lim et al., “Impact of Residential Displacement on Healthcare Access and Mental Health among Original Residents of Gentrifying Neighborhoods in New York City,” *PLoS One* 12, no. 12 (2017). See also: BARHII, “Displacement Brief” (BARHII Bay Area Regional Health Inequities Initiative, February 2016), <https://phasocal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/BARHII-displacement-brief.pdf>; T. Jelleyman and N. Spencer, “Residential Mobility in Childhood and Health Outcomes: A Systematic Review,” *Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health* 62, no. 7 (July 1, 2008): 584–92; Maxia Dong et al., “Childhood Residential Mobility and Multiple Health Risks During Adolescence and Adulthood: The Hidden Role of Adverse Childhood Experiences,” *Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine* 159, no. 12 (December 1, 2005): 1104–10; Yerko Rojas, “Evictions and Short-Term All-Cause Mortality: A 3-Year Follow-up Study of a Middle-Aged Swedish Population,” *International Journal of Public Health* 62, no. 3 (April 1, 2017): 343–51; Ramphal et al., “Evictions and Infant and Child Health Outcomes: A systematic review,” *JAMA Network Open* 6, no. 4 (2023); Schwartz et al., “Childhood Eviction and Cognitive Development,” *Social Science & Medicine* 292 (2022); Hatch and Yun, “Losing Your Home Is Bad for Your Health: Short- and Medium-Term Health Effects of Eviction on Young Adults,” *Housing Policy Debate* 31, no. 3-5 (2020): 469–489; Smith et al., “Eviction from Rental Housing and Its Links to Health: A scoping review,” *Health & Place* 86 (2024); Hoke and Boen, “The Health Impacts of Eviction: Evidence from the national longitudinal study of adolescent to adult health,” *Social Science & Medicine* 273 (2021); Graetz et al., “The Impacts of Rent Burden and Eviction on Mortality in the United States, 2000–2019,” *Social Science & Medicine* 340 (2024).
- 122 E.g., Margot Kushel and Tiana Moore, “Toward a New Understanding: The California Statewide Study of People Experiencing Homelessness,” UC San Francisco Benioff Homelessness and Housing Initiative, June 2023, [https://homelessness.ucsf.edu/sites/default/files/2023-06/CASPEH\\_Report\\_62023.pdf](https://homelessness.ucsf.edu/sites/default/files/2023-06/CASPEH_Report_62023.pdf); Cheyenne Garcia, Kelly Doran, and Margot Kushel, “Homelessness And Health: Factors, Evidence, Innovations That Work, And Policy Recommendations,” *Health Affairs* 43, no. 2 (February 2024): 164–71, <https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2023.01049>; Lydialyle Gibson, “How Homelessness Is a Public Health Crisis,” *Harvard Magazine*, April 5, 2024, <https://www.harvardmagazine.com/2024/05/homelessness-public-health-crisis>.
- 123 Pierina Ana Sanchez, Moses Gates, and Sarah Serpas, “Pushed Out: Countering Housing Displacement in an Unaffordable Region,” Center for New York City Affairs, February 21, 2018, <http://www.centrernyc.org/pushed-out>. See also: Alex Horowitz, Chase Hatchett, and Adam Staveski, “How Housing Costs Drive Levels of Homelessness,” Pew, August 22, 2023, <https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2023/08/22/how-housing-costs-drive-levels-of-homelessness>; Gregg Colburn and Clayton Page Aldern, *Homelessness Is a Housing Problem: How Structural Factors Explain U.S. Patterns*. University of California Press, 2022; Chris Glynn and Alexander Casey, “Homelessness Rises Faster Where Rent Exceeds a Third of Income.” Zillow Research, December 11, 2018, <https://www.zillow.com/research/homelessness-rent-affordability-22247/>.
- 124 For example, BARHII, “Displacement Brief”; Rebecca Cohen and Keith Wardrip, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Exploring the Effects of Housing Instability and Mobility on Children” (Center for Housing Policy; MacArthur Foundation, February 2011), [http://mcstudy.norc.org/publications/files/CohenandWardrip\\_2009.pdf](http://mcstudy.norc.org/publications/files/CohenandWardrip_2009.pdf); Adam Voight, Marybeth Shinn, and Maury Nation, “The Longitudinal Effects of Residential Mobility on the Academic Achievement of Urban Elementary and Middle School Students,” *Educational Researcher* 41, no. 9 (December 1, 2012): 385–92.
- 125 National Coalition for the Homeless, “Education of Homeless Children and Youth,” NCH Fact Sheet (National Coalition for the Homeless, August 2007).
- 126 Ben Christopher, “To Attract Teachers, Pricey California School Districts Are Becoming Their Landlords,” *CalMatters*, March 1, 2017, <https://calmatters.org/education/2017/03/to-attract-teachers-pricey-school-districts-are-becoming-their-landlords/>.
- 127 E.g., see Climate and Community Institute and The Sierra Club, “Tenant Protections for Climate Justice,” Explainer (Climate and Community Institute; The Sierra Club), October 2024, [https://climateandcommunity.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/CCISierra\\_TenantProtections\\_final.pdf](https://climateandcommunity.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/CCISierra_TenantProtections_final.pdf); Ruthy Gourevitch, “Decarbonization Without Displacement: Tenant Advocacy in the Context of Inflation Reduction Act Implementation,” Climate and Community Project, January 2024, [https://climateandcommunity.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/CCP-IRA\\_final-brief.pdf](https://climateandcommunity.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/CCP-IRA_final-brief.pdf); Chelsea Kirk, “Decarbonizing California Equitably: A Guide to Tenant Protections in Building Upgrades/Retrofits Throughout the State,” Los Angeles: Strategic Alternatives for a Just Economy, 2023, <https://www.saje.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Decarbonizing-California-Equitably-Report-1.pdf>.
- 128 Will Dominie, “Is Just Growth Smarter Growth?: The Effects of Gentrification on Transit Ridership and Driving in Los Angeles’ Transit Station Area Neighborhoods” (Applied Planning Research Project, University of California, Los Angeles, 2012), <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5vf5x8pg>; Stephanie Pollack, Barry Bluestone, and Chase Billingham, “Maintaining Diversity In America’s Transit-Rich Neighborhoods: Tools for Equitable Neighborhood Change” (Dukakis Center for Urban and Regional Policy at Northeastern University, October 2010), <https://www.northeastern.edu/csshresearch/dukakiscenter/publication/maintaining-diversity-in-americas-transit-rich-neighborhoods-tools-for-equitable-neighborhood-change/>.
- 129 Justine Marcus and Miriam Zuk, “Displacement in San Mateo County, California: Consequences for Housing, Neighborhoods, Quality of Life, and Health,” (Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley, May 2017), [https://www.urbandisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/impacts\\_of\\_displacement\\_in\\_san\\_mateo\\_county.pdf](https://www.urbandisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/impacts_of_displacement_in_san_mateo_county.pdf).
- 130 H. Gibbs Knotts and Moshe Haspel, “The Impact of Gentrification on Voter Turnout,” *Social Science Quarterly* 87, no. 1 (March 1, 2006): 110–21.
- 131 Gillian Slee and Matthew Desmond, “Eviction and Voter Turnout: The Political Consequences of Housing Instability,” *Politics & Society* 51, no. 1 (March 1, 2023): 3–29, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292211050716>.
- 132 Chew and Treuhaft, “Our Homes, Our Future: How Rent Control Can Build Stable, Healthy Communities,” PolicyLink; Center for Popular Democracy; The Right to the

- City Alliance, 2019, [https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/OurHomesOurFuture\\_Web\\_08-02-19.pdf](https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/OurHomesOurFuture_Web_08-02-19.pdf).
- 133 <https://www.nj.gov/dca/codes/publications/xlsaffordableguide/passaic.xlsx>; [https://www.nj.gov/dca/codes/publications/pdf\\_guide\\_2\\_afford\\_hsg/appendix\\_a.pdf](https://www.nj.gov/dca/codes/publications/pdf_guide_2_afford_hsg/appendix_a.pdf); [https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Housing/documents/2023-05-25-PHA\\_Detailed\\_Information.xlsx](https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Housing/documents/2023-05-25-PHA_Detailed_Information.xlsx).
- 134 Based on analysis of 2025 property assessment data, excluding units built in 1978 and after. See Appendix for more information on methodology.
- 135 The rent board continues to fund its 25 staff mostly through a \$16.50 monthly per unit fee. Leslie Gordon, "Strengthening Communities Through Rent Control and Just-Cause Evictions: Case Studies from Berkeley, Santa Monica, and Richmond" (Urban Habitat, January 2018), 10, [https://rentboard.berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Other\\_2018\\_Jan\\_Urban%20Habitat\\_Strengthening%20Communities%20Through%20Rent%20Control.pdf](https://rentboard.berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Other_2018_Jan_Urban%20Habitat_Strengthening%20Communities%20Through%20Rent%20Control.pdf); Everett, Lauren E. M. "Fortunate People in a Fortunate Land: Dwelling and Residential Alienation in Santa Monica's Rent-Controlled Housing." Ph.D. in Urban Studies, Portland State University, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.7864>, p. 92; Rent Control Agency, "Santa Monica Rent Control Board 2024 Annual Report," Santa Monica, CA: Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 2025, p. 6, <https://www.santamonica.gov/media/Document%20Library/Topic%20Explainers/Rent%20Control%20Information%20by%20Subject/SMRCB%202024%20Annual%20Report.pdf>.
- 136 High costs of homelessness also include the price of criminalization and incarceration; these practices are inhumane, exacerbate the problem, and should be reformed. National Alliance to End Homelessness, "Ending Chronic Homelessness Saves Taxpayers Money," National Alliance to End Homelessness, February 17, 2017, <https://endhomelessness.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Cost-Savings-from-PSH.pdf>.
- 137 Diana Elliott and Emma Kalish, "The Cost of Eviction and Unpaid Bills of Financially Insecure Families for City Budgets," (Urban Institute, January 24, 2019), <https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/opportunity-ownership/projects/cost-eviction-and-unpaid-bills-financially-insecure-families-city-budget>.
- 138 E.g., Gabrielle LaMarr LeMee, "Track the Money for Prop 33: Contributions for and against California's Ballot Measure on Rent Control," Los Angeles Times, September 27, 2024, <https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2024-09-27/proposition-33-money-support-opposition-californias-statewide-ballot-measure>; Felicia Mello, "We Fact-Checked the Ads about Proposition 33, California's Rent Control Ballot Measure," CalMatters, October 18, 2024, sec. Housing, <http://calmatters.org/housing/2024/10/prop-33-2024-fact-check/>.
- 139 E.g., Tom Slater, "From Displacements to Rent Control and Housing Justice," Urban Geography 42, no. 5 (May 28, 2021): 701–12, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2021.1958473>; Mark Paul, James K. Galbraith, Isabella Weber, Janelle Jones, and J. W. Mason, "Re: Tenant Protections for Enterprise-Backed Multifamily Properties Request for Input," July 28, 2023, [https://peoplesaction.org/wp-content/uploads/Economist-Sign-on-Letter\\_-FHFA-RFI-Response-1.pdf](https://peoplesaction.org/wp-content/uploads/Economist-Sign-on-Letter_-FHFA-RFI-Response-1.pdf); Gary Painter, "No, Rent Control Doesn't Always Reduce the Supply of Housing," LaTimes.com, October 31, 2018, <http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-painter-rent-control-economist-20181031-story.html>; Richard Arnott, "Time for Revisionism on Rent Control?," The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Nashville 9, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 99, <https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.9.1.99>; Stephen Barton, "The Economics of Residential Rent Control," Dollars & Sense, February 2019, [https://rentboard.berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Other\\_2019\\_Barton\\_The%20Economics%20of%20Residential%20Rent%20Control.pdf](https://rentboard.berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Other_2019_Barton_The%20Economics%20of%20Residential%20Rent%20Control.pdf); Slater, "Rent Control and Housing Justice," Finisterra 55, no. 114 (2020): 59–76, <https://doi.org/10.18055/Finis19772>; Hamish Kallin, Neil Gray, Joe Beswick, Damian Dempsey, Siobhan Donnachie, Tommy Gavin, Jennie Gustafsson, et al., "Rent Controls in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on an International Symposium," Radical Housing Journal 6, no. 2 (October 28, 2024): 237–51, <https://doi.org/10.54825/DZKS1999>.
- 140 Paul et al., "Re: Tenant Protections for Enterprise-Backed Multifamily Properties Request for Input," July 28, 2023, [https://peoplesaction.org/wp-content/uploads/Economist-Sign-on-Letter\\_-FHFA-RFI-Response-1.pdf](https://peoplesaction.org/wp-content/uploads/Economist-Sign-on-Letter_-FHFA-RFI-Response-1.pdf); John I. Gilderbloom and Richard P. Appelbaum, Rethinking Rental Housing (Temple University Press, 1988); Timothy L. Collins, "Rent Regulation in New York: Myths and Facts," 2009, <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Lo6qeKjEqZ03RUo9tSLyUvABsScrn9Mz/view?usp=sharing>; Kenneth Baar, Patrick Burns, and Daniel Flaming, "San Jose ARO Study: Final Report," Final Report (Economic Roundtable, April 2016), p. 177, <https://economicrt.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/San-Jose-ARO-Study-ERT-Final-Report.pdf>; Justin Justin Kadi, "Recommodifying Housing in Formerly 'Red' Vienna?" Housing, Theory and Society 32, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 247–65, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14036096.2015.1024885>.
- 141 Longitudinal studies in New Jersey, as well as studies in the Bay Area, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Washington DC, and elsewhere have not found a negative impact on construction rates. Ambrosius, Joshua D. et al., "Forty Years of Rent Control: Reexamining New Jersey's Moderate Local Policies after the Great Recession," Cities: The International Journal of Urban Policy and Planning, no. 49 (August 14, 2015): 121–33; Gilderbloom and Ye, "Thirty Years of Rent Control: A Survey of New Jersey Cities," Journal of Urban Affairs 29, no. 2 (2007): 207–20; Gilderbloom, "Moderate Rent Control: Its Impact on the Quality and Quantity of the Housing Stock," Urban Affairs Quarterly 17, no. 2 (December 1981): 123–42; Miriam Zuk, "Rent Control: The Key to Neighborhood Stabilization? | Urban Displacement Project," September 9, 2015, <https://belonging.berkeley.edu/rent-control-key-neighborhood-stabilization>; Planning & Development Department, "Rent Control in the City of Berkeley, 1978 to 1994: A Background Report" (Planning & Development Department, City of Berkeley, May 27, 1998); Baar et al., "San Jose ARO Study: Final Report," 177; Keating, Teitz, and Skaburskis, eds., Rent Control; J. W. Mason, "Considerations on Rent Control," November 14, 2019, <https://jwmason.org/slackwire/considerations-on-rent-control/>; Slater, "From Displacements to Rent Control and Housing Justice," Urban Geography 42, no. 5 (May 28, 2021): 701–12, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2021.1958473>.
- 142 David P. Sims, "Out of Control: What Can We Learn from the End of Massachusetts Rent Control?" Journal of Urban Economics 61 (2007): 129–51; Edward L. Glaeser, "Does Rent Control Reduce Segregation?" *Swedish Economic Policy Review* 10 (2003): 179–202.
- 143 Diamond, Timothy McQuade, and Franklin Qian, "The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco," NBER



Working Paper No. 24181, (National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2018), <https://www.nber.org/papers/w24181>.

144 See notes 91 and 105.

145 Edward G. Goetz, Anthony Damiano, Peter Hendee Brown, Patrick Alcorn, and Jeff Matson, "Minneapolis Rent Stabilization Study," Minneapolis, MN: Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, 2021. p. 2, <https://www.cura.umn.edu/sites/cura.umn.edu/files/2021-08/Minneapolis-Rent-Stabilization-Study-web.pdf>.

146 Seymour et al., "Rent Control in New Jersey: What Is It? Where Is It? How Does It Work?" Ralph W. Voorhees Center for Civic Engagement & Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, Rutgers University, 2024, p. 17.

147 Seymour et al., "Rent Control in New Jersey: What Is It? Where Is It? How Does It Work?"

148 Passaic, N.J. Code § 231-4(A)

149 In New York City, for lease renewals between October 1, 2024 and September 30, 2025. <https://portal.311.nyc.gov/article/?kanumber=KA-03296>; <https://dcba.la-county.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Rent-Increase-Bulletin-RSTPO-Jan-2025-June-2025.pdf>.

150 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, ENU3403140010, <https://data.bls.gov/PDQWeb/en>.

151 See notes 98-101.

152 [https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il/il2025/2025summary.odn?STATES=34.0&INPUTNAME=METRO35620MM0875\\*3403199999%2B-Passaic+County&statelist=&stname=New+Jersey&wherefrom=&statefp=34&year=2025&ne\\_flag=&selection\\_type=county&incpath=&data=2025&SubmitButton=View+County+Calculations](https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il/il2025/2025summary.odn?STATES=34.0&INPUTNAME=METRO35620MM0875*3403199999%2B-Passaic+County&statelist=&stname=New+Jersey&wherefrom=&statefp=34&year=2025&ne_flag=&selection_type=county&incpath=&data=2025&SubmitButton=View+County+Calculations); <https://data.census.gov/table/ACSST1Y2023.S1901?q=passaic+nj+median+income>; <https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/home/home-rent-limits/> summarizes 24 CFR 92.252 (<https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-24/subtitle-A/part-92/subpart-F/section-92.252>).

153 Jung Hyun Choi and Caitlin Young. "Owners and Renters of 6.2 Million Units of Small Buildings Are Particularly Vulnerable During The Pandemic," Urban Institute, August 10, 2020. <https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/owners-and-renters-62-million-units-small-buildings-are-particularly-vulnerable-during-pandemic>.

154 Tim Henderson. "Investors Bought A Quarter of Homes Sold Last Year, Driving Up Rents," Stateline, July 22, 2022. <https://stateline.org/2022/07/22/investors-bought-a-quarter-of-homes-sold-last-year-driving-up-rents/>. Alexander Hermann. "8 Facts About Investor Activity In The Single-Family Rental Market," Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, July 18, 2023. <https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/8-facts-about-investor-activity-single-family-rental-market#>.

155 Steve Strunsky, "As the Market Heats up, Newark Tries to Keep Rents under Control." NJ.com, August 9, 2023, <https://www.nj.com/essex/2023/08/as-the-market-heats-up-newark-tries-to-keep-rents-under-control.html>.

156 Michael Trujillo, Liren Ma, Lily Braunstein, Chris Schildt, and Matt Renfro, "The Failure of For-Profit Affordable Housing and How Tenants Are Organizing for Change," Urban Habitat and East Bay Community Law Center, March 2024, p. 50, 56-57., <https://urbanhabitat.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Tenant-Protections-in-LI-HTC-Report-FINAL-WEB.pdf>.

157 Breneman Capital. "Red Flags to Lookout For When Underwriting Multifamily Properties?" March 15, 2024. <https://www.breneman.com/blog/what-are-some-red-flags-in-underwriting-assumptions>. Ike Hoffman. "Multifamily Underwriting: Modest Rent Growth is Not a Given," N.D., Tactica Real Estate Solutions. <https://www.tacticares.com/blog-feed/multifamily-underwriting-modest-rent-growth-is-not-a-given>.

158 E.g., Disability Rights Advocates, "Smith v. City of Oakland," August 28, 2019, <https://dralegal.org/case/smith-v-city-of-oakland/>.

159 <https://www.portlandmaine.gov/1462/Housing-Dashboard>

160 Based on analysis of 2025 property assessment data. We estimate SFRs by counting 1-unit residential properties that are not owner-occupied. See Appendix for more information on methodology.

161 Ibid.

162 Based on analysis of 2025 property assessment data, to identify residential units built between 1978 and 1995, excluding single-family homes and owner-occupied duplexes. See Appendix for more information on methodology.

163 Chew and Treuhaft, "Our Homes, Our Future: How Rent Control Can Build Stable, Healthy Communities," (PolicyLink; Center for Popular Democracy; The Right to the City Alliance, 2019), p. 27, 28, 31, [https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/OurHomesOurFuture\\_Web\\_08-02-19.pdf](https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/OurHomesOurFuture_Web_08-02-19.pdf); Slater, "From Displacements to Rent Control and Housing Justice," Urban Geography 42, no. 5 (May 28, 2021): 701-12, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2021.1958473>; Margery Austin Turner, Housing Market Impacts of Rent Control: The Washington, D.C. Experience (Urban Institute, 1990), 75, 86, <https://archive.org/details/housingmarketimp00turn>.

164 N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1.

165 N.J.S.A. 2A:42-10.10 et seq.

166 See, e.g. Passaic, N.J. Code § 231-13.

167 E.g., Gil-Trejo, Laura, Rachel Peterson, Frederick Rose, and Eduardo Castillo. "Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board Survey of Tenants of Registered Rental Units: 2022 Report." City of Berkeley; Social Science Research Center, CalState Fullerton, 2023. <https://rentboard.berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022%20Tenant%20Survey%20Presentation%20and%20Results.pdf>.

168 New York City Housing Preservation & Development. "New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS)", <https://www.nyc.gov/site/hpd/about/research.page>.

169 Lauren E. M. Everett, "Fortunate People in a Fortunate Land: Dwelling and Residential Alienation in Santa Monica's Rent-Controlled Housing." Ph.D. in Urban Studies, Portland State University, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.7864>, pp 92-93.

170 <https://www.policylink.org/resources-tools/tools/all-in-cities/housing-anti-displacement/topa-copa>.